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This Article seeks to fill a critical gap in the current literature relating
to the international ordering of cyberspace: the link between jurisdictional
assertions by realspace sovereigns and their effects on the global effort to
administer the Internet. We analyze the United States’ response to disputes
over domain names, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(“ACPA”), which permits a trademark owner to seek cancellation or transfer of the domain name by proceeding in rem against the domain name
itself, thereby expanding the scope of the ACPA to encompass disputes
with little direct connection to the United States. Congress appears to have
developed 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) based on a misunderstanding of the
constitutional requirements for adjudicative jurisdiction in the U.S. courts;
and early court decisions interpreting the provision have perpetuated the
misunderstanding. This Article argues that there exist no cases of foreign
cybersquatting (aside from certain cases involving anonymous registrants)
as to which the in rem provision will be both applicable and constitutional.
The ACPA is notable for its aggressive approach to jurisdiction, and its
expansive view of jurisdiction reveals the extent to which realspace sovereigns have a critical, and yet overlooked, role in the continued viability of
a global unsegmented domain name system. By mapping the logical control over the domain name system—the distributed hierarchy that is the
basis of the system’s design—onto realspace territory, the potential for
sovereign regulation of the system becomes apparent, either under the recognized principles of prescriptive jurisdiction in international law or as a
de facto result of the geographic facts of the domain name system. We
contend that the ACPA exemplifies uncoordinated actions that are likely
to result in segmentation of the domain name system and thus a decline in
social welfare.
† Assistant Professors University of Pennsylvania Law School. We thank Stuart
Benjamin, Paul Berman, Stephen Burbank, Dan Burk, Michael Froomkin, Edward Hartnett, Geoffrey Hazard, Mark Lemley, Curtis Reitz and participants at the 29th Research
Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy. Remaining mistakes are
our own.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the era of the global Internet, realspace sovereigns face new problems relating to the scope and enforceability of their laws, many of which
are intended to protect local individuals and commercial entities. How
these traditional sovereigns respond to these challenges will have farreaching implications for the ordering of social and economic behavior
online.1 In this piece, we take up the case of the domain name system as
an example of challenges and solutions yet to come.
1. There have been many contributions to this field. See, e.g., David Post & David
Johnson, Law & Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367
(1996); Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998); David Johnson & David
Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1997); Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993 (1994); Henry R Perrit, Jr. The Internet is Changing International Law, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (1998); A Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617 (1999); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
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We begin by critically analyzing the United States’ response to international disputes over domain names, especially the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”).2 The ACPA offers a number of potential remedies to United States trademark owners whose marks are registered as domain names by alleged cybersquatters, both domestic and foreign. It asserts both adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign
registrants.3 This Article takes up each of those assertions in turn.
Looking first at the ACPA’s provisions with respect to adjudicative jurisdiction, Part II focuses on 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2). This provision purports to authorize a trademark owner to seek cancellation or transfer of a
domain name by proceeding “in rem” against the domain name itself in
cases where the U.S. courts cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the
alleged cybersquatter. The text and history of the provision indicate that
Congress intended to authorize in rem proceedings in cases where a foreign registrant’s lack of contacts with the United States would render a
U.S. court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over the registrant unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause. However, as we discuss below, in
such cases the registrant’s lack of U.S. contacts will render in rem jurisdiction unconstitutional as well. The ACPA’s in rem provision, therefore,
fails effectively to reach the cases Congress appears to be targeting.4
Regulatory Arbitrage (book chapter) in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE (Brian Kahin &
Charles Nesson eds., 1997); Jonathan Weinberg, Internet Governance, in TRANSNATIONAL CYBERSPACE LAW (Makoto Ibusuki ed., 2000); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and
the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting Through the Debris of Self-Regulation. 1 INFO 477-500, (1999).
2. Pub. L. No. 106-113, Division B, §1000(a)(9), & Appendix I, Title III, §
3002(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1531-36, 1501A-521, 1501A-545-48 (1999) (codified in relevant
part at 15 U.S.C. §1125(d)).
3. The term “prescriptive jurisdiction” denotes the power to legislate, while the
term “adjudicative jurisdiction” refers to the power of a court to hear and determine a
matter. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301
(5th ed. 1998).
4. In a recent article, Suzanna Sherry argues that the ACPA, “while not unconstitutional, [is] shortsighted.” Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 311 (2002). Professor Sherry notes that
some courts have found in rem jurisdiction available under the ACPA despite finding
insufficient contacts between the registrant and the forum to justify in personam jurisdiction. See id. at 340. Sherry seems agnostic on the question discussed in Part II below:
whether an in rem suit can proceed in the absence of minimum contacts between the registrant and the forum. See id. at 343 (noting one court’s conclusion “that the minimum
contacts test of International Shoe applie[s] to in rem as well as quasi in rem actions,”
but taking no position on “[w]hether or not that is a fair reading of Shaffer”). Instead,
Sherry argues that the ACPA’s in rem provision is redundant because in cases where
courts have proceeded under the ACPA’s in rem provisions, “it is probable that in the
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Apart from its constitutional deficiencies, though, the in rem provision
is conceptually intriguing because it turns on the assertion that the res in
question (the domain name) is located within the forum (the United
States). The ACPA thus attempts to base in rem jurisdiction on the premise that a domain name is located in the United States whenever either the
dealer or the administrator involved in registering or assigning the domain
name is U.S.-based.5 The theoretical and practical problems with such an
approach lead naturally to our consideration of the implications of Congress’s assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over domain name disputes,
and, more broadly, the role of realspace sovereigns in domain name regulation.
Our analysis of prescriptive jurisdiction begins by describing the aspects of logical control6 over the domain name system. The technological
facts of the domain name system (in particular the hierarchy in the system’s design7) correlate control over certain components (especially the
root servers) with effective control over the entire system. By mapping
this logical control structure onto the contours of realspace, the potential
regulatory authority of realspace sovereigns becomes apparent. This regulatory authority can be grounded in either the widely-accepted principles
of prescriptive jurisdiction or the de facto result of the physical location of
elements of the domain name system. In the prescriptive jurisdiction case,
the location of certain elements, specifically the root or TLD servers,8
within a sovereign’s territory will in almost all cases provide at least subabsence of the ACPA the courts would have examined the precedent more carefully and
found the requisite personal jurisdiction over the defendants.” Id. at 340.
5. The terms used by the ACPA are “registrar” and “registry.” See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(2)(A). To help distinguish the functions of these two entities, we use the terms
“dealer” and “administrator.” See infra note 39.
6. By “logical control” we refer to the power conferred by the technological features of the domain name system.
7. The domain name system is designed as a “distributed hierarchy,” with a very
large number of components relying on a small number of “root servers” for critical information. See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
8. “TLD” stands for “top level domain.” As one of us has explained previously:
Internet domain names take the form "[host].[domain].[top-level-domain]." For
example, "www.stanford.edu," where "www" is known as the hostname, "stanford" is the domain name, and "edu" is the top-level-domain name, or "TLD."
Because each Internet domain name corresponds uniquely to what is known as
an "IP address," a series of numbers that is the means by which transmissions
are routed through the Internet, the domain names themselves are normally used
as addresses. There are a limited number of TLDs, .com being the best known
....
Radin & Wagner, supra note 1, at 1298 n.8.
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stantial international legal support for the assertion of jurisdiction. Even if
a sovereign’s jurisdictional claim is not formally recognized or is controversial, de facto control can be exerted via the reality of the technology
and geography. In either event, the same basic point holds: geography
matters.
Importantly, however, while geography may influence the “territorial”
control over the domain name system, from a technological standpoint it is
largely irrelevant. The geographic facts of the domain name system are
uniquely mutable. This provides both the means and the incentive for realspace sovereigns to increase their regulatory authority by altering the geographic facts—in our example, by creating and mandating an alternative
root server system. Part IV argues that this ability to exert regulatory influence should concern the global Internet community because the creation of alternative root servers will likely result in the segmentation of the
domain name system and a concomitant reduction in its value.
The importance of realspace sovereigns in the regulation of the domain
name system calls for a reconsideration of the present regulatory approaches. In particular, the United States, which arguably stands to lose
the most from the segmentation of the domain name system, should pursue
international coordination of domain names regulation, rather than the extensive assertion of jurisdiction found in the ACPA. This Article concludes with suggestions and observations about the steps that the United
States in particular, and realspace sovereigns more generally, might take to
effectuate a policy that reflects the substantial interest in an unsegmented
domain name system.
II.

JURISDICTIONAL OVERREACHING: THE
ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT

In 1999, Congress addressed the problem of “cybersquatting”9 by
passing the ACPA, which prohibits bad-faith registration of a domain
name consisting of another’s mark.10 However, noting the difficulties of
suing foreign or anonymous domain name registrants, Congress also created an unusual procedural device for use in cases where the registrant
9. “Cybersquatting” occurs when a person registers as a domain name a word or
phrase trademarked by another and does so in the hope of either selling the domain name
to the trademark holder or earning advertising revenue from the visits of web users who
are looking for the trademark holder’s web page. See Sherry, supra note 4, at 317-18.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
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cannot be located or subjected to the jurisdiction of a United States court.
In such cases, the ACPA authorizes the mark holder to bring an in
rem suit11 directly against the domain name itself.12 Although the available
legislative history indicates that Congress believed that the in
rem provision would close a gap in the enforcement tools available to
mark holders, in reality this provision adds little to the preexisting jurisdictional bases for ACPA suits. The analysis that follows examines the juris11. In an in personam action, jurisdiction flows from the court’s authority over the
defendant’s “person” and any resulting judgment is potentially enforceable against any
assets of the defendant, wherever located. By contrast, in an in rem action of the type
authorized by the ACPA, jurisdiction is based on the court’s authority over the res—here,
the domain name—rather than on authority over the defendant’s person. Thus, any judgment in an in rem action is limited to the value of the res and the judgment can be enforced only against the res and not against any other interests of the defendant. See, e.g.,
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 4A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 1070, at 281 (2002) (discussing distinctions between in rem and in personam actions).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). The ACPA purports to authorize “an in rem civil
action.” Id. Technically, the suit authorized by the ACPA should be termed a quasi in
rem Type 1 action, because it determines the relative rights of the plaintiff and the registrant in the res and not the plaintiff’s rights in the res as against all the world. See Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958) (noting that “[a] judgment quasi in rem affects
the interests of particular persons in designated property,” and that in one type of quasi in
rem suit, “the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property
and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons”).
One district court has recently taken a different view, arguing that “ACPA in
rem actions . . . are of the ‘true in rem’ genre because they involve the rights of a disputed
mark for every potential rights holder.” Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162
F. Supp. 2d 484, 490 (E.D. Va. 2001). This assessment seems at odds with the structure
of the ACPA’s in rem provisions. The notice requirements set forth in those provisions
focus on the domain name registrant, and no one else: they require that the plaintiff send
notice of the suit to the registrant and “publish[] notice of the action as the court may
direct,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii), measures which would satisfy the due process
requirements for notice of suit with respect to the registrant, but not necessarily with respect to other entities that might have claims to the domain name. 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(2)(A)(ii). Similarly, the ACPA claims turn on the conduct of the registrant,
rather than on the relative rights of the plaintiff and any person other than the registrant.
Moreover, the ACPA provides that a successful in rem plaintiff may obtain forfeiture,
cancellation or transfer of the domain name, but the statute does not suggest that a successful ACPA plaintiff is thereby immunized from claims by any other person asserting a
superior right to the domain name.
In any event, the distinction between in rem actions and quasi in rem Type 1
actions does not affect our analysis of the ACPA’s provisions. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 cmt. a (1980) (questioning “whether the traditional distinction is
useful for any purpose”). Accordingly, for simplicity we will use the term “in rem” to
describe the ACPA’s provisions. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977)
(for convenience, using “in rem” to denote both in rem and quasi in rem).
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dictional significance of the in rem provision, and concludes that its greatest distinction lies not in its utility (which is minimal, due to constitutional
problems) but rather in its approach to the location of domain names.
A.

The mechanics of the ACPA

To prevail on a claim under the ACPA, a plaintiff must show that it
owns a protected mark, and that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or
used a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive
of the plaintiff’s mark.13 The ACPA also requires the plaintiff to establish
that the defendant acted with “bad faith intent to profit from th[e] mark.”14
To assist courts in assessing the element of bad faith, the Act includes a
nonexhaustive list of nine factors.15 Finally, the Act provides a “safe harbor” for registrants who “believed and had reasonable grounds to believe
that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”16
Where the prohibited acts occurred prior to the Act’s passage, the only
remedies available are forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name, or
transfer of the domain name to the mark owner.17 For violations that occur
after the date of enactment, the Act authorizes the award of damages and
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). More specifically, the ACPA applies only to
domain names that meet one of the following three sets of criteria: (1) a domain name
that is “identical or confusingly similar to” a mark “that is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain name”; (2) a domain name that is “identical or confusingly similar
to or dilutive of” a famous mark “that is famous at the time of registration of the domain
name”; or (3) a domain name that “is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of
section 706 of Title 18 [pertaining to the Red Cross] or section 220506 of Title 36 [pertaining to the Olympics].” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
15. The factors include: whether the registrant has an intellectual property right to
the domain name; the extent to which the domain name is commonly used to identify the
registrant; whether the registrant has previously used the domain name in offering goods
or services; the registrant’s fair use of the mark in a site accessed by means of the domain
name; whether the registrant intended to divert web users from the plaintiff’s website to
the website accessed by means of the domain name; evidence that the registrant’s intent
was to sell, not use, the domain name; the registrant’s failure to provide accurate contact
information; the registrant’s acquisition of multiple domain names that resemble protected marks; and whether the plaintiff’s mark is distinctive and famous. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, Appendix I, Title III, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1501A-552 (1999) (providing that damages remedy “shall not be available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name that occurs before the date of the enactment of this Act”);
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The
only remedy available for ACPA violations that occurred before November 29, 1999 . . .
is to have the domain name transferred to the owner of the mark or canceled”).
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costs,18 and permits the plaintiff to elect statutory damages of $1,000 to
$100,000, as determined by the court.19 If appropriate, the court may
award treble damages, and in exceptional cases the court may also award a
reasonable attorney’s fee.20
B.

Anonymous registrants

The ACPA’s drafters believed that the remedies described above
would do little good if the plaintiff was unable to discover the registrant’s
identity. The House Committee report noted that “a significant problem
faced by trademark owners in the fight against cybersquatting is the fact
that many cybersquatters register domain names under aliases or otherwise
provide false information in their registration applications in order to
avoid identification and service of process by the mark owner.”21 The federal courts traditionally have disfavored suits against anonymous defendants, and a plaintiff usually must identify and locate the defendant in order to effect service of process.22
A suit initiated prior to the passage of the ACPA, Columbia Insurance
Co. v. Seescandy.com,23 illustrates the problem of anonymous defendants.
The assignee of various trademarks associated with See’s Candy Shops,
Inc. sued in federal court, asserting federal and state law claims arising
from the registration of the domain names seescandy.com and seecandys.com by “someone other than the plaintiff.”24 Because the registrant
had provided incomplete or false information when registering the domain
names, the plaintiff was unable “to collect the information necessary to
serve the complaint” on the registrant.25 The district court recognized the
plaintiff’s need to ascertain the registrant’s identity, but it balanced this
need against “the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online fo-

18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (providing that an ACPA plaintiff may recover “(1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action”).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001)
(affirming award of attorney’s fees under ACPA).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577-78 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (noting “traditional reluctance for permitting filings against John Doe defendants or fictitious names” and stating that “the default requirement in federal court is that
the plaintiff must be able to identify the defendant sufficiently that a summons can be
served on the defendant”).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 575.
25. Id. at 577.
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rums anonymously or pseudonymously.”26 As a result, the court held that
the plaintiff must satisfy a four-part test in order to get discovery on the
issue.27
The ACPA’s in rem provision addresses the anonymous defendant
problem by removing the need to identify an evasive registrant. Under
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), a mark owner who has an ACPA claim against a
domain name registrant may sue the domain name instead of the registrant, if the owner is unable to find the registrant by sending a notice to the
postal and email addresses provided by the registrant to the dealer.28 The
Act’s requirements that the plaintiff send the notice to the addresses provided by the registrant, coupled with the additional requirement that the
plaintiff publish notice of the action,29 satisfy the due process requirements for notice of suit.30 Thus, in situations where the registrant cannot
be identified, the in rem provision holds the promise of “provid[ing]
meaningful protection to trademark owners while balancing the interests
of privacy and anonymity on the Internet.”31

26. Id. at 578.
27. First, the plaintiff “should identify the missing party with sufficient specificity
such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real person or entity who could be
sued in federal court.” Id. Second, the plaintiff should “identify all previous steps taken to
locate the elusive defendant." Id. at 579. Third, plaintiff should show that its claims
“could withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id. Fourth, the plaintiff should specify, and justify, the discovery requests and the entities to which those requests would be addressed.
Id. at 580.
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
29. The ACPA requires that the plaintiff in an in rem ACPA suit “send[] a notice of
the alleged violation and intent to proceed under [the ACPA in rem provisions] to the
registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant
to the registrar; and . . . publish[] notice of the action as the court may direct promptly
after filing the action.” Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
30. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (requiring “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”). Although the ACPA’s notice provisions will probably fail to provide actual
notice to a registrant who provides false or incomplete contact information to the dealer,
or who fails to keep that information current, such a failure should not raise a due process
problem. Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 (1983) (approving statutory notice
scheme, despite its failure to provide actual notice to appellant, because “the right to receive notice was completely within appellant’s control”).
31. 145 CONG. REC. S10513-02, S10516 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). Senator Hatch noted that “some have suggested that dissidents or others who are
online incognito for similar legitimate reasons might give false information to protect
themselves and have suggested the need to preserve a degree of anonymity on the Internet particularly for this reason.” Id. The in rem provision addresses this concern by “de
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Registrants over whom in personam jurisdiction is unavailable

In addition to the problem of anonymous registrants, the ACPA’s
drafters also intended to tackle cases where “a non-U.S. resident cybersquats on a domain name that infringes upon a U.S. trademark.”32 To this
end, § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) provides that the in rem action is also available
if the mark owner is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
registrant.33 The problem with this provision, as we demonstrate below, is
that there exist no cases of foreign cybersquatting as to which
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) is both applicable and constitutional. As we discuss
in Part II.C.1, in order for a court to have territorial jurisdiction in a particular case, there must be a basis for jurisdiction, and the exercise of that
jurisdiction must be constitutional. A review of the pertinent rules shows
that if the exercise of such jurisdiction is constitutional, there will always
be a basis for in personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against foreign
registrants. Thus, § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)’s requirement that in personam
jurisdiction be unavailable is satisfied only in cases where the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction would violate due process. Part II.C.2 surveys the
due process requirements for in personam jurisdiction, and Part II.C.3 argues that the same due process requirements apply to in rem suits under
the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.34 Thus, Part II.C concludes that in any ACPA case where the exercise of in personam jurisdiction would violate due process, the exercise of in rem jurisdiction will be
unconstitutional as well.
1.

Bases for jurisdiction

For suits in federal court,35 the basis for personal jurisdiction is found
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. So long as the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process, all in personam ACPA actions will fit
within either Rule 4(k)(1)(A) or Rule 4(k)(2).36 Rule 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes
creas[ing] the need for trademark owners to join the hunt to chase down and root out
these dissidents or others seeking anonymity on the Net.” Id.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
34. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
35. It appears that the federal and state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over in
personam suits under the ACPA. Cf. Aquatherm Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 84 F.3d 1388, 1394 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over Lanham Act claims). For purposes of simplicity, this article focuses
on ACPA suits brought in federal court.
36. Neither the ACPA nor the Lanham Act addresses the question of service of
process for in personam actions. See, e.g., ISI Int’l, Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP,
256 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that Lanham Act does not authorize worldwide
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service of process on a defendant “who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court
is located.”37 Thus, if a foreign registrant’s contacts with a particular state
in the U.S. meet the criteria of that state’s long-arm statute, and if the
minimum contacts and reasonableness requirements of due process are
met, then Rule 4(k)(1)(A) will provide a basis for the assertion of territorial jurisdiction with respect to the claim against that registrant. If the facts
of the case do not fit the relevant state’s long-arm statute, or if the registrant lacks minimum contacts with the relevant state, then the plaintiff can
turn to Rule 4(k)(2). Rule 4(k)(2) authorizes service of process on a foreign defendant, in a federal question case, provided that the defendant is
not subject to jurisdiction in the courts of any state, and provided that the
exercise of jurisdiction “is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.”38 The use of Rule 4(k)(2) is “consistent with” the ACPA
because nothing in the ACPA forbids worldwide service of process on an
in personam defendant. However, the use of Rule 4(k)(2) to authorize in
personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against a foreign registrant may
violate due process, in which event Rule 4(k)(2) is, by its own terms, inapplicable. In sum, Rule 4 will always provide a basis for in personam jurisdiction over ACPA claims against foreign registrants, unless the exercise of such jurisdiction violates due process. It is to the constitutional
analysis, thus, that we now turn.
2.

Constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction

In personam suits against foreign registrants may be constitutional in a
number of situations, including cases where the domain name was registered with a U.S.-based dealer.39 In other instances, such as where the regservice of process); Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1110
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (reaching similar conclusion in suit involving claims under Lanham Act
and ACPA). Thus, Rule 4(k)(1)(D), which permits service of process “when authorized
by a statute of the United States,” is inapplicable.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
39. A brief discussion of terminology may be helpful. “Registrars” are entities authorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) to
register domain names on behalf of registrants; they function as intermediaries between
the individual registrants and the domain name “registry.” See Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v.
Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 123 n.2 (D. Mass. 2001) (discussing distinctions between registrars and registries). While there are multiple registrars, not all of
which are based in the U.S., each TLD has only one registry, which maintains the single
authoritative set of records concerning domain names and their registrants. See id.
Verisign Global Registry Services, a Virginia-based corporation, operates the registry for
the .com, .org, and .net TLDs, which account for a very substantial number of all current
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istrant uses a foreign-based dealer, due process requirements will often not
be met. To meet the requirements of due process, a defendant must possess minimum contacts with the United States40 and the exercise of jurisdiction must not be unreasonable.41 The minimum contacts requirement,
domain names. See Verisign Contact Information, at http://www.verisigngrs.com/aboutus/contact.html (last visited July 25, 2002) (stating that Verisign is headquartered in
Virginia); Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1161 & n.2 (N.D. Ala.
2001) (discussing Verisign Global Registry Services’ role as registry for the .com, .org,
and .net TLDs); Verisign Corporate Overview, http://www.verisign.com/corporate/about/index.html (visited July 25, 2002) (asserting that .com, .org and .net domain names represent 27.3 million web addresses). Thus, the relevant registrar may be either a U.S.based or a foreign corporation, but the pertinent registry for most current domain names
is controlled by a U.S.-based corporation. To help distinguish between the two types of
entities, we will generally refer to the registrar as the “dealer” and the registry as the
“administrator.”
40. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether a defendant’s contacts with
various parts of the United States can be aggregated for purposes of the due process
analysis under the Fifth Amendment. See Omni Capital International, Ltd. v. Rudolf
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987) (unanimous opinion) (declining “to consider
the constitutional issues raised by” litigant’s contention that “a federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, based on an aggregation
of the defendant's contacts with the Nation as a whole, rather than on its contacts with the
State in which the federal court sits”); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102, 113 n.* (1987) (O’Connor, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell
and Scalia) (finding “no occasion . . . to determine whether Congress could, consistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than
on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits”). It
appears, however, that when a foreign defendant is sued under a federal statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process, the court may aggregate all of the defendant’s United States contacts in order to assess whether the assertion of jurisdiction
would comport with due process under the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Go-Video Inc. v.
Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “when a [federal] statute authorizes nationwide service of process, national contacts analysis is appropriate”).
Thus, in cases where the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the state in
which the district court sits, but has contacts with other parts of the United States, the
contacts can be aggregated to satisfy the minimum contacts analysis under Rule 4(k)(2).
See, e.g., ISI Int’l, 256 F.3d at 551 (holding that federal court can exercise jurisdiction
under Rule 4(k)(2) over defendant who has “ample contacts with the nation as a whole,
but whose contacts are so scattered among states that none of them would have jurisdiction”). Likewise, because the ACPA’s quasi in rem section provides for worldwide service of process, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)-(B), this article assumes that a federal
district court asserting jurisdiction under that section should assess whether the defendant
possesses minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with the state
in which the district court sits.
41. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (discussing
reasonableness analysis).
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which is designed to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant
having no significant “contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum,42 is satisfied when a defendant “purposefully direct[s]” its actions at the forum
and the litigation arises out of or relates to those acts.43
Several considerations support the argument that a registrant who uses
a U.S.-based dealer to acquire a domain name creates minimum contacts
with the United States.44 Although the registrant may communicate with
the dealer solely over the Internet, the Court has held that minimum contacts may be found even when the defendant never physically enters the
forum.45 It seems likely that most registrants will be aware of the nationality of the dealer they use. The dealer’s website will usually provide reasonable notice that the dealer is a U.S.-based corporation and may even
reveal the specific location of the dealer’s physical headquarters. In instances where a reasonable person would infer from the dealer’s website
that the dealer is U.S.-based, registrants who contract with that dealer to
register a domain name can be seen as purposefully directing their activities to the United States.46
42. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
43. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). “General jurisdiction,” which exists when a defendant’s contacts with the forum are sufficiently extensive
to support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to the contacts, will usually not be available
in ACPA cases involving foreign registrants, since such registrants are unlikely to have
the requisite “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum.
44. Cf. David F. Fanning, Note, Quasi in Rem on the Cyberseas, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1887, 1920 (2001) (arguing that a domain name registrant should be aware “that the
forum in which her chosen domain name registrar resides has an interest in regulating the
continuing obligation of the registrar”).
45. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (“So long as a commercial actor's efforts are
‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected
the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.”).
46. Although a defendant’s contract with a forum resident will not always suffice to
establish minimum contacts, such contacts may be shown by the circumstances of the
contract. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79 (explaining that “in determining whether
the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum,” a court must
consider factors such as “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along
with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing”); McGee v. Int'l
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that circumstances surrounding insurance contract established minimum contacts where, inter alia, “[t]he contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of
that State when he died”); Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding minimum contacts with Ohio where defendant entered into a contract with
an Ohio corporation, “purposefully perpetuated the relationship with [the plaintiff] via
repeated communications with its system in Ohio,” and “used [the plaintiff corporation]
to market his wares in Ohio and elsewhere”). In ACPA cases, the defendant will have
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The allegations by which the plaintiff seeks to meet the ACPA’s bad
faith element47 may establish further contacts between the registrant and
the United States.48 In assessing whether the plaintiff has properly alleged
that the registrant acted with a “bad faith intent to profit from [the plaintiff’s] mark,”49 the ACPA advises the court to consider several factors,
including “the [registrant’s] intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain name,”50 and
“the [registrant's] offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain.”51 Where a
registrant takes such actions against a U.S.-based mark owner,52 the registrant can be seen as intending to cause an effect within the United States,

entered into a contract with a U.S. dealer; the registration will have affected U.S. commerce; and the defendant may have shown an intent to damage the U.S. business of the
holder of a mark protected under U.S. law.
47
47. The statute makes “bad faith” an element of in personam ACPA claims. See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). The ACPA’s in rem provision does not explicitly mention bad faith.
However, it authorizes a suit in rem if (1) the domain name violates the plaintiff’s trademark rights and (2) the plaintiff is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over, or is
unable to locate, “a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under” the
ACPA’s in personam provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A). A number of courts have
concluded that this reference to the in personam provisions incorporates the bad faith
element into the in rem claim as well. See Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com,
106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that bad faith is an element of ACPA
in rem claims); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425
(E.D. Va. 2000) (following Broadbridge Media); Hartog & Co. AS v. Swix.com, 136 F.
Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2001) (following Harrods). The Fourth Circuit, however,
disagrees. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 2002 WL 141428, at *12
(4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the ACPA’s “in rem provision not only covers bad faith
claims under § 1125(d)(1), but also covers infringement claims under § 1114 and §
1125(a) and dilution claims under § 1125(c)”).
48. For a detailed argument that the evidence relevant to bad faith under the ACPA
may also help to establish minimum contacts, see Andrew J. Grotto, Due Process and In
Rem Jurisdiction Under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 2 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 29-45 (2001). Cf. Sherry, supra note 4, at 337 (observing that
“courts confronted with bad-faith registration of domain names” have “found ways to
conclude that the defendant had targeted the forum state”).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI).
52. Foreign holders of U.S. trademarks can also sue under the ACPA, but a foreign
plaintiff presumably would have to show effects on U.S. commerce in order to state a
claim. Cf. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Lanham Act reaches extraterritorial conduct “which has a significant
effect on United States Commerce”).
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thus creating contacts for jurisdictional purposes.53 Moreover, a registrant’s choice of a .com domain name, rather than a domain name based on
a country-code TLD, may sometimes suggest an intent to target U.S. markets.54
It should be noted, however, that in five of the six cases to address the
question to date55 the court has held that a foreign defendant’s registration
of a domain name with a U.S. dealer did not create minimum contacts so
as to confer in personam jurisdiction on a federal court in the district
where the dealer is located. One early decision under the ACPA did indicate, without discussion, that a registrant’s action in registering the pertinent domain name with NSI, a Virginia corporation, sufficed “to satisfy
due process” for purposes of in personam jurisdiction.56 However, the five
subsequent decisions have held to the contrary.57 The courts that found a
due process violation reasoned that “the utility of a domain name depends
in part on the registrar’s meeting its obligations, and in part on the operation of the [domain name system], only a small portion of which falls
53. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding minimum contacts with California, under Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),
because defendant knew that the scheme of registering plaintiff’s trademarks as domain
names would have “the effect of injuring [plaintiff] in California where [plaintiff] has its
principal place of business and where the movie and television industry is centered”).
54. See, e.g., Quokka Sports, Inc. v. Cup Int’l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1111-12
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that New Zealand defendants targeted the United States when,
instead of choosing a .nz domain name, they registered a .com domain name with a U.S.based dealer; defendants “admitted that they sought out a specific domain name to target
the ‘lucrative American market’”).
55. The issue has been addressed in six published opinions, by three district judges
and one magistrate judge, in the Eastern District of Virginia. See infra notes 56-57; see
also Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 2002 WL 141442, at *3-*4, *8 (4th Cir.
2002) (implicitly assuming that the federal district court in Eastern District of Virginia
lacked personal jurisdiction over registrant); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain
Names, 2002 WL 141428, at *3 (4th Cir. 2002) (reviewing judgment rendered by federal
district court in Eastern District of Virginia, and noting without criticism the district
court’s conclusion that it lacked personal jurisdiction over registrant).
56. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 531 n.5 (E.D.
Va. 2000).
57. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 857 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that domain name registration agreements did not “create a sufficient relationship
between [the registrant] and Virginia to satisfy due process”); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v.
Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 865 (E.D. Va. 2000) (following America
Online); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522 n.1 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (following Heathmount); Hartog & Co. AS v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531,
536 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (following Heathmount); Cable News Network L.P. v.
CNNnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 n.16 (E.D. Va. 2001) (citing America Online
and Heathmount).
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within the domain name registrar’s control.”58 Moreover, the typical domain name registration transaction is brief, is conducted over the Internet,
involves no negotiation of terms, and does not require the dealer to perform “substantial services” in its home state.59
Whether or not the use of a U.S.-based dealer creates minimum contacts, it seems clear that the involvement of a U.S.-based administrator,
without more, should not create the requisite contacts.60 Registrants typically have no direct interaction with the administrator. Thus, a French registrant might use a dealer based in France to register a .com domain name,
unaware that the administrator that will record the domain name is located
in the United States. Unless other factors indicate that the registrant aimed
its acts at the United States, such a registrant lacks sufficient contacts with
the forum to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the registrant.
In any event, even if minimum contacts exist, a defendant can secure
dismissal if it can show that the exercise of jurisdiction would nonetheless
be unreasonable,61 based on a five-factor test. The test considers the burden on the defendant, the forum’s interest in hearing the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, the international judicial system’s interest
in the efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interests of various nations in furthering substantive social policies.62 Admittedly, the
58. Am. Online, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
59. Id. at 855 n.21; Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 866-67.
The courts that found a due process violation generally appeared to assume that
the minimum contacts analysis should look to the registrant’s contacts with a particular
state, rather than aggregating all of the registrant’s contacts with the United States. As
noted above, that assumption is open to question. See supra note 40. The courts’ preoccupation with assessing the registrant’s contacts with the state of Virginia, rather than
with the United States as a whole, may have altered some factors in the analysis. Thus,
for instance, while it may be true that the registrant of a .com domain name would be
unaware that NSI is located in Virginia, see Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 866 & n.7, it
is far less plausible that such a registrant would be unaware that it was dealing with a
U.S. dealer. On the whole, however, it does not appear that nationwide aggregation of
contacts would have altered these courts' conclusions that registration with a U.S. dealer
is insufficient to create minimum contacts.
60. The fact that no published opinion to date addresses the latter question suggests
that potential plaintiffs agree with this assessment.
61. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (indicating that
defendant has burden of demonstrating unreasonableness).
62. When the Court enunciated these five factors in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980), and applied them in Burger King, 471 U.S. at
476-77, 482-84, it was evaluating state courts’ assertions of jurisdiction over defendants
located outside the forum state but within the United States. Accordingly, the Court described the last two factors in terms applicable to interstate, rather than international, disputes: “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
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burden on a foreign defendant of litigating an ACPA claim in the United
States will be considerable.63 In addition, the policies of other nations with
respect to the regulation of trademarks, and domain names in particular,
may differ substantially from those of the United States, and a United
States court’s adjudication of an ACPA claim may contravene such policies.64 Balanced against the burden on the defendant and the effect on
other countries’ trademark policies, however, are the United States’ interest in adjudicating the dispute and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining effective relief.65 The ACPA grew out of congressional concern that U.S.
businesses lacked recourse against cybersquatters, including foreign cybersquatters.66 Its remedies are presumably available only to holders of a
mark protected under United States law; and though neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant need be a U.S. citizen, the ACPA applies only in cases
where the bad-faith registration has a significant effect on U.S. com-

of controversies” and “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.” World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The Court has
since noted that the application of these two factors to the assertion of jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant “calls for a court to consider the procedural and substantive policies of
other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction.” Asahi Metal
Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (holding California state court’s assertion of jurisdiction over Japanese defendant unreasonable under the circumstances).
63. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must
defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the
reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”).
64. On the other hand, Asahi’s treatment of the reasonableness factors also suggests
that the social policies of other nations may weigh more heavily in the defendant’s favor
when a state court asserts jurisdiction than when a federal court asserts jurisdiction under
a federal statute. The Asahi Court noted that a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction over
an alien defendant must be assessed in light of the federal government’s interest in guiding foreign relations. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115. Where Congress has enacted legislation
authorizing suit against a foreign cybersquatter, a federal court’s assertion of jurisdiction
may be less open to question because the concern of state interference with federal foreign policy does not arise.
65. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (“When minimum contacts have been established,
often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify
even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”). It could also be argued that the
fifth factor—the international interest in efficient dispute resolution—favors the plaintiff,
because an ACPA suit provides a means to determine the rights of each party in the relevant domain name.
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999) (noting the need to address situations
where “a non-U.S. resident cybersquats on a domain name that infringes upon a U.S.
trademark”).
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merce.67 Accordingly, the reasonableness analysis may on balance favor
the exercise of jurisdiction.
3.

Constitutionality of in rem jurisdiction

As we have seen, the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over ACPA
claims against foreign registrants will sometimes be constitutional, but in
other cases it will violate due process. In the latter instances,
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I) purports to make in rem jurisdiction available. Contrary to the apparent expectations of the ACPA’s drafters, however, due
process requires that there be “minimum contacts” between the registrant
and the forum, no matter whether the ACPA claims are denominated in
personam or in rem.68 In cases where the assertion of in personam jurisdiction would violate due process, the assertion of in rem jurisdiction
would likewise be unconstitutional.69
The drafters of the ACPA apparently assumed that a foreign registrant
who registered a domain name in bad faith70 would lack contacts sufficient
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction,71 but that the in rem provision would help to fill this gap. The ACPA’s drafters predicted that in
rem suits would not offend due process, “since the property and only the
property is the subject of the jurisdiction, not other substantive personal
rights of any individual defendant.”72 In keeping with this view, a number
67. Cases under other provisions of the Lanham Act indicate that a major factor in
determining the Lanham Act’s reach is whether the defendant’s alleged conduct had a
significant effect on U.S. commerce. See, e.g., Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d 98, 104 n.2, 105
(2d Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of foreign defendant’s Lanham Act counterclaim because defendant failed to use its mark in commerce in the United States and the mark was
not a famous mark); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Lanham Act reaches extraterritorial conduct “which has a
significant effect on United States Commerce”).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 74-93.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
70. The ACPA also prohibits bad-faith trafficking in or use of domain names. See
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). For purposes of simplicity, however, we focus on bad-faith
registration. The jurisdictional issues raised in suits alleging trafficking or use would be
similar to those in cases of bad-faith registration; if anything, the case for jurisdiction
might be stronger in trafficking or use cases, to the extent that such activities provided
additional contacts between the defendant and the United States.
71. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999) (stating that “personal jurisdiction
cannot be established over the domain name registrant” when the registrant is not a U.S.
resident).
72. H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14. Damages are not available in ACPA in rem actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (“The remedies in an in rem action under this
paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.”).
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of the courts that have applied the ACPA have accepted the notion that in
rem jurisdiction is available despite the absence of minimum contacts for
in personam purposes.73 Such a conclusion, however, contravenes the Supreme Court’s statement in Shaffer v. Heitner74 that all assertions of jurisdiction,75 whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem, must meet the
minimum contacts requirements developed in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington76 and its progeny.77
Shaffer involved attachment jurisdiction, also known as quasi in
rem Type 2 jurisdiction, but the Shaffer Court made clear that the principles it set forth also apply to in rem and quasi in rem Type 1 jurisdiction.
In Shaffer, the plaintiff brought a shareholders’ derivative suit in Delaware
state court against officers and directors of a Delaware corporation,78
based on the attachment, pursuant to a Delaware statute, of corporate stock
and options owned by the individual defendants.79 The plaintiff alleged
that the individual defendants had breached their duties to the corporation
by causing the corporation and a subsidiary to engage in activities in Oregon that led to a civil damages award and a large criminal contempt fine.80
73. See Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 2002 WL 141428, at *3, *6
(4th Cir. 2002) (assuming that in personam jurisdiction was unavailable over registrant in
Eastern District of Virginia, and holding nonetheless that “courts in Virginia, the state
where the Domain Names are registered, may constitutionally exercise in rem jurisdiction
over them”); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 2002 WL 141442, at *8-*9 (4th
Cir. 2002) (assuming that the district court in Eastern District of Virginia lacked in personam jurisdiction over registrant, but holding that the district court had in rem jurisdiction over domain names); Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d
860, 867-68 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding insufficient contacts for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction, but allowing quasi in rem claim to proceed); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v.
www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 522 n.1 (E.D. Va. 2000) (same); Hartog & Co.
AS v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 & n.5 (E.D. Va. 2001) (same); Cable News
Network L.P. v. CNNnews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001), (same).
74. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
75. The statement in Shaffer pertained to “assertions of state-court jurisdiction,” 433
U.S. at 212, but the Court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction
by federal courts. See infra text accompanying notes 122-123.
76. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77. The argument that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495
U.S. 604 (1990), limits Shaffer’s statement concerning minimum contacts, is addressed
below. See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
78. The suit named as defendants Greyhound Corp., Greyhound’s wholly owned
subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-eight current or former officers or directors
of one or both entities. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90.
79. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190-94. Under a Delaware statute, the stock of a Delaware
corporation was deemed to be located within the state for purposes of attachment. Id. at
192 n.9.
80. Id. at 190.
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The Delaware courts denied the defendants’ jurisdictional challenge, reasoning that quasi in rem jurisdiction, which traditionally was based on attachment of property within the jurisdiction, did not require that the defendants have contacts with the forum.81 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed, rejecting both the jurisdictional conclusion and its premise. Noting that under International Shoe, “the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation” had become “the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction,”82 the Court proceeded to consider
whether the International Shoe standard “should be held to govern actions
in rem as well as in personam.”83 Because “judicial jurisdiction over a
thing” (the traditional conception of in rem jurisdiction) is merely “a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing,”84 the Court concluded that “in order to justify an exercise
of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify” in personam jurisdiction—i.e., it must meet “the minimum-contacts
standard elucidated in International Shoe.”85 The Court made clear that
this standard applied to all assertions of in rem jurisdiction, not just to the
type of quasi in rem jurisdiction that was at issue in Shaffer itself: the
Court stated flatly that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny,” and it added that “[t]o the extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.”86
Consistent with its stated intention to set a standard for application to
all in rem cases, the Court took pains to assess the likely effect of its new
approach on different types of in rem jurisdiction.87 Under International
Shoe, although the mere fact that property is present within the forum will
not in itself justify jurisdiction, that fact is nevertheless relevant, for it can
help to provide the requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and
81. Id. at 196.
82. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204.
83. Id. at 206.
84. Id. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Introductory Note (1971)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 212 & n.39.
87. Justice Powell’s concurrence in Shaffer provides a further indication of the
scope of the majority opinion. Justice Powell wrote separately to express the following
caveat: “I would explicitly reserve judgment . . . on whether the ownership of some forms
of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the
State to the extent of the value of the property.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J.,
concurring). The fact that Justice Powell felt it necessary to state this reservation suggests
that he viewed the Court’s opinion as having a potentially broad sweep.
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the forum. As the Court put it, “when claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to
have jurisdiction,” since “the defendant’s claim to property located in the
State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s
protection of his interest.”88 Moreover, in such cases the forum will often
have “strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its
borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes
about the possession of that property,” and relevant evidence and witnesses will often be found within the forum89—factors which would support the argument that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that its extension of the International
Shoe standard to all assertions of state-court jurisdiction was unlikely to
affect jurisdiction over most in rem actions other than those in which the
property attached was unrelated to the claim.90
The Court recognized, however, that in quasi in rem Type 2 cases such
as Shaffer itself, the imposition of the International Shoe standard would
“result in significant change,” because the defendant’s ownership of property within the forum would be unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action.91 Where the cause of action does not relate to, or arise out of, the defendant’s contacts with the forum, those contacts will not meet the International Shoe standard unless they are continuous and systematic—a test
that will not be met by the mere ownership of property within the forum.92
In Shaffer, the Court concluded that neither the defendants’ ownership of
stock in the Delaware corporation nor their positions as officers or directors of that corporation provided the requisite minimum contacts for purposes of the shareholders’ derivative suit. Accordingly, it held that the
Delaware courts’ assertion of jurisdiction violated due process.93
Although it might at first seem that the ACPA’s in rem provisions satisfy the minimum contacts analysis sketched out in Shaffer, such an argument does not withstand scrutiny. The argument is that a plaintiff can
bring an ACPA in rem suit only when the domain name was registered by
a U.S. dealer or administrator, that in such instances, the ACPA deems the
88. Id. at 207-08.
89. Id. at 208.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Continuous and systematic contacts with the forum have been held sufficient for
the exercise of jurisdiction over an unrelated claim against a corporation. See Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
93. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213-17.
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domain name to be property located within the United States, and that the
plaintiff’s claim thus arises directly out of a claim to the registrant’s property located within the forum. However, as the Shaffer Court noted, even
in cases where the plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of, or relates to, the
defendant’s claim of ownership of the pertinent property, the presence of
that property within the forum will not always support the inference of
contacts between the defendant and the forum.94
The Shaffer Court’s caveat foreshadows the issues raised by the
ACPA. The ACPA’s in rem provision authorizes suits against domain
names registered with a U.S. dealer or administrator.95 Assuming that
Congress has the authority to designate domain names as a form of property that can be subjected to attachment for purposes of in rem jurisdiction,96 and assuming further that Congress has the authority to provide that
such domain names are located within the United States whenever the
dealer or administrator involved in registering the domain name is located
within the United States, the resulting “presence” of the domain name
within the United States does not, without more, provide minimum contacts between the registrant and the United States.97 If, for example, the
registrant registered the domain name with a foreign dealer and had no
idea that the domain name would be administered by a registry based in
the United States, the “presence” of the domain name within the United
States would not indicate the existence of minimum contacts between the
registrant and the United States. In sum, the “presence” of the domain
name within the United States adds nothing to the minimum contacts
analysis; either the registrant has minimum contacts so as to satisfy due

94. The Court suggested that such an inference might be unfounded, for example, in
cases where a chattel was brought into the forum without the owner’s consent or where
the plaintiff’s fraud induced the owner to send the chattel into the forum. See Shaffer, 433
U.S. at 208 n.25 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 60 cmts. c &
d).
95. Such suits are to be brought “in the judicial district in which the domain name
registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
96. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 2002 WL 141442, at *9 (4th Cir.
2002) (“Congress may treat a domain name registration if it chooses, without violating
the constitution”).
97. Cf. Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121,
135 (D. Mass. 2001) (refusing to interpret the ACPA as permitting suit in any district
where documents establishing control of the domain name are deposited with the court,
because “a statute that creates a res out of an intangible bundle of rights, and then gives
to any plaintiff with a colorable claim the right to transfer that res to the forum of its
choice, anywhere in the nation, offends notions of fair play”).
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process, or else the International Shoe standard will bar the exercise of
any type of jurisdiction, either in rem or in personam.98
Under Shaffer, then, the ACPA in rem provision is of use only in cases
involving anonymous registrants; in cases where, instead, the registrant is
known but cannot be subjected to an in personam ACPA claim, the registrant’s lack of minimum contacts with the United States will similarly bar
the assertion of in rem jurisdiction. Two district courts in the Eastern District of Virginia have resisted this conclusion, arguing that Shaffer does
not require the application of minimum contacts analysis to ACPA in rem
actions.99 For example, the court in Cable News Network L.P. v.
Cnnews.com (“CNN”) held that “in an ACPA in rem action, it is not necessary that the allegedly infringing registrant have minimum contacts with
the forum.”100 The arguments advanced to support this assertion fall into
three general categories: (1) that Shaffer’s requirement of minimum contacts is dictum as applied to the in rem cause of action created by the
ACPA and can thus be disregarded;101 (2) that Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Burnham v. Superior Court102 somehow overruled Shaffer’s requirement

98. Shaffer also forecloses the argument that the limited nature of the remedies
available through an in rem suit loosens the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Am.
Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 858 n.32 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that registration of a domain name did not create contacts sufficient to justify in personam jurisdiction, and distinguishing a quasi in rem ACPA case on the ground that “the registrant’s
contact with [the registrar] satisfied due process” in light of “the limited relief available
under the in rem proceeding, namely forfeiture of the domain name in question”). While
the Shaffer Court recognized that “the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem action is limited by the value of the property,” it found this fact irrelevant to the due process
analysis because the fairness of subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction “does not depend
on the size of the claim being litigated.” Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 n.23.
99. See Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (holding that because ACPA actions are “properly categorized as 'true in rem,'
there is no requirement that the owner or claimant of the res have minimum contacts with
the forum”); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (holding that in ACPA actions “it is unnecessary for minimum contacts to
meet personal jurisdiction standards” because “under Shaffer, there must be minimum
contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in those in rem proceedings where the underlying cause of action is unrelated to the property which is located in the forum state”).
The drafters of the ACPA also appear to have relied on this contention See H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 106-464, at 114 (1999) (quoting a district court’s statement that “[i]n a true in
rem proceeding . . . due process requires only that the property itself have certain minimum contacts with the territory of the forum”).
100. Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va.
2001).
101. See id.
102. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
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of minimum contacts for in rem actions;103 and (3) that other authorities
provide some basis for a refusal to apply the minimum contacts test to
ACPA in rem claims.104 However, each of these arguments fails.
As demonstrated above, the Shaffer Court clearly intended to extend
the International Shoe framework to all cases of in rem jurisdiction; and
whether that extension was dictum or holding, it should be applied to the
in rem provisions of the ACPA.105 Notably, the Shaffer Court itself characterized as a “holding” its conclusion “that any assertion of state-court
jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard.”106 Moreover,
Shaffer’s core principle—that jurisdiction over a thing is merely another
way of describing jurisdiction over the interests of persons in that thing—
applies with equal force to all in rem cases, irrespective of whether the
cause of action is related to the property that forms the basis for jurisdiction. Indeed, recognizing this, the majority in Shaffer analyzed the probable effects of the holding on cases in which “claims to the property itself
are the source of the underlying controversy.”107 Even if Shaffer’s statement is dictum as it applies to in rem and quasi in rem Type 1 cases,108 it
103. See Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 491 nn.19 & 20.
104. See id. at 491 n.19 and accompanying text.
105. See Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121,
134 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The logic of Shaffer’s limitations would appear to extend to actions in which the existence of the property in the state cannot fairly be said to represent
meaningful contacts between the forum state, the defendant, and the litigation. While this
will generally be type II quasi in rem actions, it will not be so exclusively”); Paul Schiff
Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction: Cyberspace, Nation-States, and Community
Definition, 151 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at *, on file with authors)
(noting that although “[s]ome courts read Shaffer narrowly,” dicta in the Shaffer majority
opinion suggest “that the . . . Court intended its holding to extend . . . to all in rem jurisdiction,” so that “Shaffer may be taken to stand for the proposition that Congress cannot
avoid the Constitutional requirements of fair play and substantial justice simply by calling an action in rem, and by limiting recovery to the res itself”).
106. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (“It appears . . . that jurisdiction
over many types of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard.”).
107. Id. at 207. Although the Court then proceeded to focus on the application of the
minimum contacts test to the assertion of quasi in rem Type 2 jurisdiction, that focus
arose not only from the fact that Shaffer itself involved quasi in rem Type 2 jurisdiction,
but also from the Court’s belief that “acceptance of the International Shoe test would
most affect this class of cases.” Id. at 209.
108. It is not self-evident that the statements concerning these types of in rem jurisdiction should be viewed as dictum. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040 (1994) (arguing that the distinction between holding and dictum
should turn on the rationale articulated by the court, rather than simply on “facts and outcomes”).
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is carefully considered dictum. When the Supreme Court articulates a general principle of constitutional doctrine, and especially when the Court
takes pains, as it did in Shaffer, to assess the implications of that principle
for contexts other than that of the case at hand, lower courts should be
slow to brush the principle aside as mere “dictum.”109
The CNN court acknowledged that “there is language in Shaffer that
could be read to require that all in rem cases conform to the same due
process constraints as in personam cases,” but asserted that “the greater
weight of (and more persuasive) authority holds that the language of
Shaffer requires minimum contacts only for quasi in rem II-type cases.”110
The authorities referred to, however, are either inapposite or erroneous.
For example, the court cites Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham, a case in
which the Court upheld a state court’s assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who was personally served with process while
physically present in the forum state.111 In the portion of the Burnham
opinion cited by the CNN court, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
109. It is a truism that dictum does not constitute binding precedent. As Chief Justice
Marshall stated, “general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection
with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may
be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very
point is presented for decision.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399 (1821). Nonetheless, the lower federal courts customarily accord substantial weight to Supreme Court
dictum that was carefully considered by the Court. See, e.g., Guidry v. Sheet Metal Wkrs.
Int’l Assoc., Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 706 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993) (“If [Supreme Court]
dicta had clearly resolved the issue in this appeal we would be bound by that decision.”);
McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (“[F]ederal appellate
courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the
Court’s outright holdings, particularly when . . . a dictum is of recent vintage and not
enfeebled by any subsequent statement.”); Nichol v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d
115, 120 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the Court of Appeals “should respect considered
Supreme Court dicta”); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (“The Supreme Court cannot limit its constitutional adjudication to the narrow
facts before it in a particular case. In the decision of individual cases the Court must and
regularly does establish guidelines to govern a variety of situations related to that presented in the immediate case. The system could not function if lower courts were free to
disregard such guidelines whenever they did not precisely match the facts of the case in
which the guidelines were announced.”); Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 707 (6th Cir.
1974) (“Even the Court’s dicta is [sic] of persuasive precedential value.”); Fouts v. Md.
Cas. Co., 30 F.2d 357, 359 (4th Cir. 1929) (“[D]icta of the United States Supreme Court
should be very persuasive.”); cf. United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975)
(stating that “considered or ‘judicial dictum’ where the Court . . . is providing a construction of a statute to guide the future conduct of inferior courts,” though not binding, “must
be given considerable weight”).
110. Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 490-91.
111. See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)




%(5.(/(<7(&+12/2*</$:-2851$/

>9RO

Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, argued that the International Shoe minimum contacts analysis need not be applied to the Burnham defendant, and
distinguished Shaffer on the basis that it involved an “absent defendant,”
rather than one who is physically present within the forum state at the time
of service of process. “The logic of Shaffer’s holding—which places all
suits against absent nonresidents on the same constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact—does not compel the conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically to absent ones.”112 Notably, Justice
Scalia’s description of Shaffer’s “logic” actually supports Shaffer’s application to “all suits against absent defendants”—including ACPA in rem
actions.113
It is true that Justice Scalia also argued that the result in Burnham
should turn on the historical pedigree of “tag” jurisdiction, and that this
reliance on tradition contradicts the Court’s approach in Shaffer, which
applied minimum contacts analysis to in rem jurisdiction despite its “ancient form.”114 Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Burnham, however, would not
validate the use of the ACPA’s in rem procedure, because as he acknowledged, “[f]or new procedures, hitherto unknown,” the due process inquiry
is guided by International Shoe.115 Although in rem jurisdiction has a long
historical pedigree, the same cannot be said of the application of in rem
jurisdiction to Internet domain names. Rather, the ACPA’s attempt to use
domain names and Internet contacts as a basis for jurisdiction is an indisputably modern construct. Justice Scalia’s appeal to tradition in Burnham
thus provides no support for the constitutionality of the ACPA’s in rem
provisions. In any event, no part of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham
gained the votes of a majority of the Justices.
Of the other authorities cited by the CNN court, the only sources that
directly support CNN’s holding116 are one district court case and one law
112. Id. at 621.
113. ACPA in rem suits involve “absent defendants,” because in all such suits—other
than cases involving anonymous registrants—the registrant will be located outside the
forum. Accordingly, Justice Scalia’s discussion in Burnham, which turned on the presence of the defendant within the forum state, is by its own terms inapposite.
114. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy,
J.).
115. Id.
116. The CNN court cites four other authorities which are inapposite.
In Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation,
605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979), the court upheld the assertion of quasi in rem Type 1 jurisdiction because the attached funds were payments that the plaintiff had made to the defendant with respect to the contract at issue in the case, and the payments were in the
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review article.117 In Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com,118 the
court rejected the argument that the minimum contacts requirement applies to the assertion of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA, reasoning that
Shaffer is limited to cases in which the cause of action “is unrelated to the
property which is located in the forum state.”119 This argument, which is
merely a restatement of the “Shaffer as dictum” argument, fails for the
relevant New York bank account pursuant to the contract. See id. at 655. The court also
noted that the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity supported the exercise of jurisdiction
because there was no indication that the defendant would be amenable to suit anywhere
else in the world. See id. at 655. Finally, the court reasoned that “jurisdiction by attachment of property should be accorded special deference in the admiralty context.” Id.
In Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1980), a case involving in personam jurisdiction, the court held that Shaffer did not undermine the holding of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins, the
Court had held that a corporation that carries on continuous and systematic activities
within a state can be sued in the courts of that state on a claim unrelated to the corporation’s in-state activities. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. Far from being at odds with the
International Shoe minimum contacts requirement, Perkins articulates the nature of that
requirement in cases of general jurisdiction. Shaffer’s statement that the International
Shoe analysis governs all state court assertions of jurisdiction does not undermine Perkins. Thus, the court’s statement in Schreiber that “Shaffer is distinguishable,” Schreiber,
611 F.2d at 793, is both correct and utterly irrelevant to the question presented by the
ACPA.
In John N. John, Jr., Inc. v. Brahma Petroleum Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1220
(W.D. La. 1988), the court found Shaffer inapposite because “the property attached is the
very subject of the cause of action. Id. at 1222. Since the property in question was tangible and the plaintiff shipped it into the jurisdiction on the defendant's behalf, see id. at
1220, the property’s presence within the forum might well be seen to provide contacts
between the defendant and the forum. Moreover, the court found that “sufficient contacts” existed because the defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the state, by contracting to do business within the state. Id. at
1222.
Finally, the CNN court cites a law review article that does not support the
court’s argument. See Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 967-68 (2000) (noting that “in Shaffer, the
Supreme Court concluded that the minimum contacts standard was applicable to all assertions of jurisdiction,” and proposing a “minimum interests test” that “would produce the
same due process results in property-based actions as those identified by the Shaffer
Court”).
117. See Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va.
2000); Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 137-40
(2000).
118. 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000).
119. Id. at 504. Despite its assertion that “it is unnecessary for minimum contacts to
meet personal jurisdiction standards,” the Caesars World court proceeded to address the
question of minimum contacts, and concluded that “the fact of domain name registration
with Network Solutions, Inc., in Virginia supplies” such contacts. Id.
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reasons discussed above. The law review article, likewise, relies mainly on
the contention that Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion weakens the force of
Shaffer120—an assertion which is unpersuasive for the above reasons.121
There remain two possible arguments not yet advanced by the courts
that have rejected Shaffer’s application to ACPA cases: first, that Shaffer
by its terms applies only to assertions of jurisdiction by state, not federal
courts, and second, that even if Shaffer ordinarily would require minimum
contacts for ACPA in rem suits, such suits should be allowed to proceed
under the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity.122 Neither argument, however, is likely to succeed.
Admittedly, the limitations imposed by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment on the exercise of territorial jurisdiction by federal
courts differ in some respects from the limitations imposed on state courts
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, it appears likely that the Fifth Amendment due process analysis
can in appropriate cases look to an absent defendant’s contacts with the
United States as a whole, rather than just to the defendant's contacts with
the state in which the federal court sits.123 However, in other respects the
doctrines of federal-court territorial jurisdiction draw heavily upon the due
process analysis developed under the Fourteenth Amendment;124 and
though the Shaffer Court referred only to state-court jurisdiction, the logic
of the opinion supports a similar analysis with respect to federal-court jurisdiction as well. Accordingly, Shaffer’s requirement that the defendant
have minimum contacts with the forum should apply equally to federal
court assertions of in rem jurisdiction under the ACPA, although the
minimum contacts analysis would focus on the registrant’s contacts with
the United States as a whole.
The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity also does not validate the
ACPA’s in rem provision. That doctrine has been argued to support a
120. See Lee, supra note 117, 137-40. Lee also seems to suggest that Shaffer itself
does not require minimum contacts analysis in in rem or quasi in rem Type 1 proceedings, and he asserts that in any event the registration of a domain name with NSI in Herndon, Virginia provides the requisite minimum contacts for an ACPA suit. See id. at 14143.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 111-115.
122. See Fanning, supra note 44, at 1923-26 (discussing application to ACPA of doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity); see also Grotto, supra note 48, at 26-28.
123. See supra note 40.
124. For example, courts analyzing the scope of federal-court in personam jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment due process clause use the International Shoe minimum
contacts analysis. See, e.g., Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368-69 (3d Cir.
2002).
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court’s exercise of jurisdiction over defendants, despite the defendants’
lack of minimum contacts with the forum, if no other court would have
territorial jurisdiction over the defendants.125 For example, the Court in
Shaffer noted, but did not consider, “the question whether the presence of
a defendant’s property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when
no other forum is available to the plaintiff.”126 The Court subsequently indicated, however, that such a theory is unavailable in cases where the defendant is subject to suit in a foreign court.127 The courts of the country
where a domain name registrant is located presumably will have territorial
jurisdiction over claims against that registrant.128 Moreover, domain name
registrants are subject to nonjudicial proceedings under ICANN’s Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, and those proceedings provide a
successful claimant the same remedies as the ACPA’s in rem provi-

125. Commentators have argued that Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950), provides support for the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity. In
Mullane, the Supreme Court held that the New York state courts had power “to determine
the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident,” in a trust created under New York
law. Id. at 313. The Court emphasized “the interest of each state in providing means to
close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision
of its courts.” Id. Commentators have adduced this reasoning as support for the argument
that “defendants who do not have contacts with the state [should] be subject to the jurisdiction of the state for purposes of settling their claims” in cases involving absent trust
beneficiaries or claimants to land located within the state. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U.
WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 278-79 (2d ed. 2000). However, such considerations do not
justify the assertion of jurisdiction by necessity in litigation under the ACPA. Although
the U.S. played a dominant role in the formation of the Internet, domain names are not
creatures of United States law in the way that the trust in Mullane was a creature of New
York state law. Nor does the federal government supervise the administration of the domain name system, as the New York courts supervised the administration of New York
trusts: rather, the administration of the domain name system is currently supervised by
ICANN. Moreover, as noted in the text, ICANN has its own mechanism for resolving
domain name disputes, so that an assertion of jurisdiction by U.S. courts probably would
not be considered “necessary.”
126. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
127. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., the Court rejected the plaintiffs’
jurisdiction by necessity argument on the ground that the plaintiffs “failed to carry their
burden of showing that all three defendants could not be sued together in a single forum
. . . for example, . . . in either Colombia or Peru.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984).
128. Admittedly, the fact that a foreign court would have territorial jurisdiction over
the registrant does not necessarily mean that the foreign court would also have subject
matter jurisdiction over an ACPA claim against that registrant, or that foreign law would
provide any similar remedy. However, these questions are academic, because the availability of the UDRP procedures should remove any argument that jurisdiction by necessity validates the ACPA’s in rem provisions. See infra note 129.
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sions.129 Accordingly, the doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity seems
unlikely to validate those provisions.
In sum, contacts between a registrant and the United States will suffice
for in rem jurisdiction only if the contacts are extensive enough to support
in personam jurisdiction as well. If the requisite minimum contacts exist,
in personam jurisdiction will be available, and thus § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)
will not apply. As a result, the only cases in which § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I)
provides a basis for in rem jurisdiction are those in which the exercise of
jurisdiction would violate due process. Once the courts recognize this constitutional problem, the ACPA’s in rem provision will be of no use to a
mark owner seeking to sue a foreign domain name registrant who lacks
minimum contacts with the United States. Indeed, the provision already is
of little use, as most mark owners choose to proceed under the ICANN
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy instead of suing in federal court under the ACPA.130 Thus, the significance of the in rem provision lies mainly in Congress’ aggressive assertion of jurisdiction over domain name disputes involving foreign registrants, and in Congress’ attempt to ground the exercise of jurisdiction in the purported “presence” of
the domain name within the United States, which in turn depends on the
location of the dealer or administrator within the United States. Similarly,
as we discuss below, the strength of the United States' claim to prescriptive jurisdiction over international domain name disputes depends largely
on the present geographical location of the registry in charge of administering the key top-level domains. But while the in rem provision’s use of
dealer and administrator locations is of conceptual rather than practical
interest, as the in rem provision is unconstitutional according to our analysis, the significance of geography in the prescriptive jurisdiction analysis
has real-world consequences.

129. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, §§ 3(c), 4(i), at
http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited May 15, 2002) [hereinafter
UDRP] (stating that the remedies available in UDRP proceeding are the cancellation or
transfer of the domain name). Admittedly, there may be cases where a mark holder would
not be able to proceed under the UDRP; while “[t]he ACPA applies to registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name, . . . the UDRP requires both registration and use.”
David E. Sorkin, Judicial Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 50 (2001) (citing ICANN Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy § 4(a)(iii)). It seems likely, however, that in most instances a mark owner with an ACPA claim could also proceed under the UDRP.
130. See Sherry, supra note 4, at 355 (noting that the UDRP “is apparently much
more popular with trademark owners than is the ACPA: there are only about forty reported ACPA cases, but there have been over 4,000 arbitrations under the UDRP”).
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NAMING JURISDICTION: REALSPACE SOVEREIGNS &
DOMAIN NAMES

This Article now turns from the adjudicative to the legislative, and
from the constitutional to the strategic. Part III considers the implications
of the present far-reaching Congressional approach to legislative jurisdiction over domain name disputes, noting that this U.S.-centric view in this
new economic structure would not be in the long-term interests of either
the global electronic commerce community as a whole, or the U.S. participants in particular.131
A.

Distributed Hierarchy: The Control of Domain Names

As presently constituted,132 the domain name system133 is nothing
more (and nothing less) than a distributed hierarchical database—a simple
list of names and their corresponding IP addresses.134 No single computer
contains the entire database; the computers that do contain the database
(called “DNS servers”) are located in myriad locations worldwide, both
physically and logically. Yet the hierarchical nature of the system means
131. See Sherry, supra note 4. Sherry argues that the ACPA is potentially ill-advised
for several reasons: (1) the inherent confusion resulting from new statutory enactments,
id. at 342-43; (2) possible First Amendment concerns as a result of confusion in implementing the new provisions, id. at 343-48; (3) the ACPA’s limited utility in the face
of changing technology, id. at 347-50; and (4) its limited utility in light of the expansion
of the DNS namespace (by adding TLDs) and the dispute resolution provided by ICANN,
id. at 354. While we generally agree with Sherry’s suggestion that the ACPA is troubling,
only reason (4) describes a concern particular to the ACPA—as opposed to concerns
about legislation more generally. In addition, the expansion of the DNS namespace is
unlikely to diminish domain name disputes. Cf. id. Instead, the expansion of the namespace may actually generate more disputes, because the truly scarce (and thus valuable)
resource involved is web surfers’ time and attention, not domain names per se. Note, for
example, the drop-off in renewal rates for domain names starting in summer 2001. See,
e.g., Gwendolyn Mariano, It’s a Smaller World Wide Web After All, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-801088.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 2, 2002).
132. circa summer 2002.
133. We assume that readers have a working understanding of the domain name system. Brief, non-technical introductions to the domain name system can be found in a variety of places, both online and off. See, e.g., Radin & Wagner, supra note 1, at 1303;
Diane Cabell, Name Conflicts, in LEARNING CYBERLAW IN CYBERSPACE (1999), at
http://www.cyberspacelaw.org/cabell/index.html.
134. Internet communications are “packet-based,” meaning that transmissions are
separated into small data units, wrapped in addressing (and other) information, and sent
across the Internet. In order to reach their destination, packets must be addressed with the
appropriate “IP address”—a unique number corresponding to each machine connected to
the Internet. When an Internet user requests a page using a domain name (say, for example, www.yahoo.com, the domain name system provides the correct IP address.
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that some parts of the database are more important than others. For the
purpose of illustrating this point, the Article will consider the system as
having three distinct levels: the “root” level, the “TLD” level, and the
“user” level, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Domain Name Hierarchy

User DNS Servers

TLD Servers

Root Servers

The user DNS servers respond to individual groups of users or machines—for example, subscribers to a particular ISP or those within a corporate or university network. That is, the user DNS servers for the University of Pennsylvania contain the addressing information for the machines
relating to upenn.edu, the University of Pennsylvania’s assigned domain
name, and serve DNS queries sent by these machines.135
The TLD servers hold the addressing information for the user DNS
servers about an entire top-level-domain. Here, the .edu TLD server would
contain (among others) the addressing information for the upenn.edu DNS
server.136
135. For example, the IP address for the machine with the name law.upenn.edu is
130.91.144.200. This information is maintained by the Penn DNS servers, the primary
one of which is located at 128.91.254.4.
136. This information is easily found by conducting a “whois” query on the appropriate database. A web-based user interface to one such database can be found at
http://www.netsol.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois. The whois record for upenn.edu contains the
following DNS data (last visited July 21, 2002):
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The “root servers” hold addressing information relating to the TLD
servers, such as the location of the .edu TLD server.137 Because DNS requests for out-of-network resources (say a user in the Penn network requests the address corresponding to www.yahoo.com) will in theory138 require requests to each level of the DNS system described above, it becomes apparent that the hierarchy of the system determines the number of
requests to which the various servers must respond. That is, the .edu TLD
server will (absent caching) be involved in all out-of-network requests involving the .edu domain, and the root server will be involved in essentially
all DNS requests.
This distributed hierarchy, then, has unquestionable regulatory significance: involvement in DNS requests means an ability to exert power, at
least over the immediately higher (in our Figure 1) DNS level. Indeed, the
regulatory significance of the DNS hierarchy is what ICANN, the present
administrator of the public root server system, uses to ensure universal
adoption of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Because
ICANN controls the root servers, it determines the status of the TLD servers. Further, ICANN can essentially exert full regulatory control over the
domain name system by mandating that any TLD administration applicant
either: (a) agree to require its domain name registrants to consent to the
provisions of the UDRP; or, (b) seek ICANN’s specific approval for any
alterations from the UDRP.139
Domain servers in listed order:
noc3.dccs.upenn.edu
128.91.254.4
noc2.dccs.upenn.edu
128.91.254.1
dns1.udel.edu
128.175.13.16
dns2.udel.edu
128.175.13.17
137. As of Summer 2002, the TLD servers for .edu were:
a.root-servers.net.
h.root-servers.net.
c.root-servers.net.
g.root-servers.net.
f.root-servers.net.
b.root-servers.net.
i.root-servers.net.
e.root-servers.net.
d.root-servers.net.
138. As a practical matter, local DNS servers often “cache” recent requests.
139. See ICANN, New TLD Application Process Overview, at http://www.icann.org/tlds/application-process-03aug00.htm (Aug. 3, 2000) (“For unsponsored TLDs, ICANN
will have policy-formulation responsibility for the new TLD and the policies will initially
be generally defined as the existing policies for .com, .net, and .org . . . ”). Of course
ICANN can (and does) delegate some policymaking authority to TLD operators, most
prominently in the case of a “sponsored” TLD—where ICANN delegates some policy
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Mapping Control: Geography and the Domain Name System

Thus far we have described what might be called “logical” control
over the domain name system: the technological ability to exert power by
virtue of administration of the important components of the DNS system.140 And yet while this alone raises a number of interesting questions,141 we want to raise a slightly different set of issues: those surrounding the realspace sovereigns’ approach to regulation of the domain name
system.
The domain name system unquestionably exists in realspace. It is
merely a collection of computer hardware and software (and people who
administer and maintain them); each of these constituent components is
“real” in any sense of the word, and can be found at various geographic
points throughout the world. As such, it is possible to map the domain
name system onto realspace, where concepts like borders and sovereignty
are crucially important (at least from a regulatory perspective). Thus, the
resulting map of the distributed hierarchy of the domain name system has
what might be called "territorial" regulatory significance. It is to the implications of this territorial regulatory significance that we now turn.
C.

The Significance of Territorial Regulation

Territorial significance plays out in at least two ways. First, as an international legal matter, the geographic location of the domain name system may be widely recognized as supporting a strong claim to prescriptive
(or legislative) jurisdiction over various disputes that arise relating to the
system. Second, even if a prescriptive jurisdictional claim is not widely
recognized, the geographic location of the domain name system may
making authority to the sponsoring organization. See ICANN, New TLD Program, at
http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last updated July 18, 2002) (“Generally speaking, an 'unsponsored' TLD operates under policies established by the global Internet community directly
through the ICANN process, while a 'sponsored' TLD is a specialized TLD that has a
sponsor representing the narrower community that is most affected by the TLD. The
sponsor thus carries out delegated policy-formulation responsibilities over many matters
concerning the TLD"). Nonetheless, the control (provided by administration of the root
server system) is there.
140. This general view—the correlation between control over technology and policymaking—is a common theme in recent “cyberlaw” scholarship. For an excellent overview, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
141. Many issues surround the ICANN's establishment as the authoritative body for
the present public root server system. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the
Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); Milton Mueller, supra note 1, at 477500. See also the excellent material relating to ICANN collected by ICANN Watch, a
watchdog organization, at http://www.icannwatch.org/.
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nonetheless determine whether (and to what extent) realspace sovereigns
can regulate the system. However, the geographic location of the domain
name system is essentially arbitrary. That is, while the logical regulatory
significance of the hierarchy of the domain name system is inherent in the
technology, the geography is not. Put simply, the root servers could move,
taking with them the territorial regulatory significance. Furthermore, a realspace sovereign142 set on increasing the present regulatory authority
available to itself—either recognized under international law or de facto—
could alter the geographic facts, by creating additional root servers and
requiring their use. This observation suggests a reconsideration of the aims
of present regulation of the domain name system by realspace sovereigns,
in particular the United States’ approach embodied in the ACPA. We take
up this final point in Section IV below, while first discussing the dual implications of territoriality and the domain name system.
1.

Recognized Authority: Prescriptive Jurisdiction & Domain
Names

We turn first (and briefly) to the significance of prescriptive jurisdictional claims.143
a)

The Principles of Prescriptive Jurisdiction

As a general matter, international law widely recognizes at least two
bases of prescriptive jurisdiction:144 the principles of territoriality145 and
nationality.146
142. Or set of sovereigns, of course. For example, a group of sovereigns, perhaps
organized regionally or culturally, might establish and mandate its own root server system, with shared or delegated policy authority.
143. This subsection is not intended as a comprehensive description of the issues
surrounding prescriptive jurisdiction. Rather, our goal is to provide context to support our
argument that the geography of the domain system will have realspace regulatory implications.
144. We use the terms “legislative jurisdiction” and “prescriptive jurisdiction” interchangeably here, given the context in which we write: the analysis of the scope of Congressional authority to legislate on the matter of domain names. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
OF THE LAW, THIRD, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 401(a) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
145. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(1); BARRY CARTER & PHILIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 728-733 (2d ed. 1995).
146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(2); CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 145,
at 728. Other recognized principles of prescriptive jurisdiction include: (a) the “protective” principle; (b) the “passive personality” principle; and, (c) the “universality” principle. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 145, at 728-733. Each of these, while established in international law, is applied in specific circumstances unlikely to implicate disputes over domain names. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402 cmt. f (de
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“Territoriality” refers to the notion that a sovereign state has a claim to
prescribe conduct within its physical territory,147 and the “status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory.”148 Although some
commentators have suggested that the territorial principle should be the
complete basis for asserting prescriptive jurisdiction,149 the modern view
recognizes that the territorial principle is both under- and over-inclusive:
it fails to account for cases in which states have a legitimate claim to prescriptive jurisdiction, and must yield in certain circumstances to extraterritorial principles that have developed to address the under-inclusiveness.150
Indeed, some commentators question the continuing viability of the territorial principle in the context of the international economic system and the
United States’ role in the world economy.151
The principle of “nationality” is also rooted in traditional notions of
state sovereignty, though in this case the “sovereignty” refers to the state’s
citizens or subjects, rather than the state’s physical territory.152 As typically stated, nationality refers to the right to prescribe “the activities, interscribing protective principle); RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402 cmt. g (describing
passive personality); RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 404 (describing universality). See
generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 145, at 777-89; MARK JANIS, INTRODUCTION
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 329-330 (2d ed. 1993); J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 225-226 (9th ed. 1984).
147. “It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as of all sovereign
independent States, that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within
its territorial limits and in all causes civil and criminal arising within these limits.” J.G.
STARKE, supra note 146, at 194 (quoting Lord Macmillan). “The principles of the territorial sovereignty and the jurisdiction of states have been two of the most fundamental
principles of international law.” JANIS, supra note 146, at 322-23.
148. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(1)(b).
149. “[T]he character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done. . . . For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of
the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference
with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other
state concerned justly might resent.” Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,
356-357 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
150. This recognition, however, is not without controversy. See infra note 160 and
accompanying text.
151. See generally Jonathan R. Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct
and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990). See also
Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1464 (1991)
(noting the difficulty of currently-justifying a presumption against extraterritoriality).
152. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932) (“Nor can it be
doubted that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the
return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in the case of refusal”).
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ests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.”153
While the invocation of basic international legal principles upon which
sovereigns may prescribe behavior at least implies limits upon the scope of
such jurisdictional claims,154 the modern reality is rather different. The
trend since early in the twentieth century, particularly with respect to the
United States, has been towards “increasingly expansive” views of prescriptive jurisdiction.155 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States suggests that prescriptive jurisdiction
clearly exists with respect to any activities that have “substantial effect[s]”
in the United States.156 The U.S. Supreme Court has vacillated confusingly
on this issue,157 but it is nonetheless clear that, to the extent that they exist
at all,158 limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction in this context are largely a
matter of international political considerations.159
The generally hortatory nature of international legal limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction paradoxically illuminates the importance of such assertions that are based largely on the traditionally-accepted bases of terri153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(2).
154. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 493 (3d ed. 1996).
155. Id. at 501. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, pt. IV, ch. 1, introductory
note; Burbank, supra note 151, at 1460-61 (noting the parallel nature of the “loosening of
mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power” in both domestic and international cases in United States courts).
156. RESTATEMENT, supra note 144, § 402(1)(c). Such extraterritorial application is,
according to the RESTATEMENT § 403, limited by what Professor Burbank describes as
“the jurisdictional ‘rule of reason’.” Burbank, supra note 151, at 1464.
157. Compare EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(invoking a presumption against extraterritorial application of laws in refusing to extend
Title VII to extraterritorial application), with Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509
U.S. 764, 795-99 (1993) (extending application of Sherman Act to extraterritorial conduct by virtue of effects in the United States).
158. See BORN, supra note 154, at 510-511 (noting that it is “well established” that
U.S. laws may violate customary international law and yet be enforceable—at least in
U.S. courts); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). See also Burbank,
supra note 151, at 1463 (noting the weakness of international legal limits on prescriptive
jurisdiction).
159. As a practical matter such issues arise in the U.S. context because (and when)
Congress has failed to specify the scope of a statute’s jurisdiction. See Burbank, supra
note 151, at 1463; BORN, supra note 154, at 510-11. Thus questions of “limits” on U.S.
legislative jurisdiction are analyzed chiefly through the lens of statutory interpretation,
and international principles of jurisdiction are implemented as presumptions in favor of
one statutory construction versus another. See, e.g., ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248; Hartford
Fire, 509 U.S. at 795-99. See generally Burbank, supra note 151, at 1463-65.
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toriality and nationality. That is, recent history demonstrates that the expansion of (at least) U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction beyond these boundaries
generates substantial international controversy160; accordingly, where such
assertions of jurisdiction comport with territoriality and nationality, we
can expect—at minimum—less international dispute.
b) Prescribing Domain Names
If territoriality and nationality are important bases of international prescriptive jurisdiction—at least in a political economy, if not practical,
sense—then it follows that the interaction between these principles and the
geographic and technologic realities of the domain name system will have
regulatory significance. Because we are especially interested in the United
States’ present regulatory approach (i.e., the ACPA, especially the in rem
provisions161), and because the current geographic facts of the domain
name system are remarkably U.S.-based, this discussion will necessarily
be heavily U.S.-focused. (Note that in the particular context in which
Congress has presently acted—legislating for domain name disputes as
they relate to trademarks—there will be one or more registered U.S.
trademarks involved.162 For purposes of our argument, however, we set
aside the international trademark issues.163)
160. One commentator notes more than fifteen “blocking statutes” passed by other
nations in response to extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws. See
Joseph P. Griffin, United States Antitrust Laws and Transnational Business Transactions: An Introduction, 21 INT'L LAW. 307, 308-309 (1987). See also BORN, supra note
154, at 584-587 (noting “protests” against extraterritorial application); Thomas C.
Fischer, Case Two: Extraterritorial Application of United States Law Against United
States and Alien Defendants (Sherman Act), 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 577, 586 & n.38
(1995).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
162. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (allowing claims based on infringement of a “mark”).
Federal trademarks are registered by application to the United States Patent and Trademark Office, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72.
163. It is an understatement to say that the application of trademark law to the online
context presents difficult international law issues. Dinwoodie has noted that the continued
expansive interpretation of national trademarks in the online context threatens to “reduce” trademark rights to “their most destructive form”—the mutual ability to block (or
at least interfere with) the online use of marks recognized in other countries. Graeme
Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of Trademarks (Jan. 19,
2001) (WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4), available at http://wipo.int/pilforum/en/documents/pdf/pil_01_4.pdf. Accordingly, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) approved in Fall 2001 a resolution calling for a more flexible recognition of
“use” of trademarks on the Internet, one that would provide protections from liability for
legitimate users of marks who disclaimed the intent to conduct commerce in a particular
country. See WIPO. Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
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Our analysis suggests that the present form of the domain name system
offers the United States a strong claim of prescriptive jurisdiction along
several dimensions of the analysis. Maintaining our focus on the bases of
nationality and territoriality, we note the following important factors involved in this analysis:
Citizenship. The citizenship of the parties to the dispute obviously invokes the nationality principle, supporting the prescriptive claim for any
corresponding sovereign.
TLD Server Location. Because almost all domain name disputes will
arise in the context of second-level domain names, the most direct authority over and responsibility for these domain names will rest with the
operation of the relevant TLD server, thereby supporting the prescriptive
claim of the sovereign in which that server is located.164
Root Server Location. As noted above, control over the root server allows at least some level of control over the entire system, though at times
this support will be indirect.165 As such, the geographic location of the root
server will support—though to a lesser degree than the location of the
TLD server—the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction based on the principle of territoriality.
Focusing on the United States, we note that the primary root server
(a.root-servers.net) is located within the United States.166 The array of
possibilities for prescriptive claims are:

Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs, on the Internet (October 2001)
(WIPO Pub. No. 845), available at http://www.wipo.org/aboutip/en/development_iplaw/pub845.htm.
We set aside the issues specific to international application of US trademark law
for several reasons. Most generally, we consider the truly notable question here to be
Congress’ approach to the regulation of domain names, especially the self-styled in rem
provisions of the ACPA; in this view, the effects on the international regulation of trademarks are parasitic on a particular view of domain names as what one of us has described
as “a species of mutant trademark.” Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of
Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1295, 1303 (1999). Here, looking beyond the mutant trademark aspects of domain names
allows, we hope, for a more focused consideration of the challenges facing sovereigns in
cyberspace.
164. Note that for simplicity, we are conflating the location of the actual hardware
(i.e., the machine) that constitutes the TLD server, and the location of the administrative
authority. We assume, for the purposes of our argument, that the hardware will typically
be in the same country as the administrators and system operators.
165. See supra text accompanying note 139.
166. As of July 30, 2002, a lookup of a.root-servers.net reveals an IP address of
198.41.0.4. Using the “NetGeo” form available at http://netgeo.caida.org/perl/netgeo.cgi,
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Table 1: U.S. Prescriptive Jurisdictional Claims
party citizenship
TLD server location
recognized prescriptive claim
US
US
US

2

mixed

US

US

3

non-US

US

US

4

US

non-US

US

5

mixed

non-US

US

6

non-US

non-US

unclear

Cases 1 and 2 are relatively easy: in each, both nationality and territoriality support the U.S. claim; in Case 2, there is a potential competing
claim based on nationality, but the clear weight of the interests balances in
favor of the U.S.167 Case 3 is perhaps more controversial. If the non-US
citizens are from separate countries, then there are at least three potentially
competing claims. Among the three, we suggest that none will have a
“clearly greater” interest than the U.S. If the non-US citizens are from the
same country, then the relative claim of that country would seem
stronger.168 In Cases 4 and 5, the U.S. claim is supported by nationality, as
well as the basis for territoriality provided by the location of the root
server.169 In our view, the location of the TLD server does not provide a
“clearly greater” claim in this context, though we admit these Cases are
close.
the physical location of a.root-servers.net is revealed as Herndon, Virginia, USA (or approximately 38º 98’ N, 77º 39’ W).
167. Where multiple sovereign states have significant and potentially-conflicting
claims to jurisdiction, courts will often resort to devices that compare—or balance—the
relative strengths of the interests. For example, pursuant to RESTATEMENT § 403(3), supra note 144, when multiple countries have competing claims, a “clearly greater” claim
must be recognized. See also Burbank, supra note 151, at 1463-64 (noting the techniques
for resolving these conflicts).
168. See, e.g., Heathmount v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va.
2000) (ACPA action between Canadian citizens). The court in Heathmount did not address this issue.
169. Note that the analysis of the “effects” of domain name activity is likely to approximate a wash in cases where the DNS system is available worldwide. That is, the
effects of a domain name in the United States is likely to be similar to the effects of the
same domain name in another country; both states might be able to note the effects in
their territory, but it seems unlikely that either effect would be clearly greater than the
other.
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Case 6 has an uncertain result. Of course, the U.S. would have at least
some support from the principle of territoriality as a consequence of the
location of the root server. We think, however, that this support would be
less than the support provided by the location of the TLD server. Yet that
would be the full extent of the support for the U.S. claim, leading us to
conclude that the U.S. claim will likely (though not certainly) be outweighed by a competing claim, especially if the location of the TLD
server and the citizenship of at least one of the parties corresponds.
This exercise leads us to two points. First, even though the U.S. Constitution severely limits the impact of the in rem provisions of the
ACPA,170 the U.S. prescriptive jurisdictional claim (under the widelyrecognized principles of territoriality and nationality) appears to be quite
strong generally. Second, as far as recognizable claims of prescriptive jurisdiction goes, geography matters: the physical location of the TLD and
root servers plays a crucial role in evaluating potentially competing claims
of prescriptive jurisdiction, at least according to the traditional bases of
territoriality and nationality. Here, the geographic fact that the root servers
(at least the primary one and its administration) and the most populated
TLD servers are geographically located within the United States, grants
the United States a considerable amount of regulatory latitude under recognized principles of international jurisdiction. And while the U.S. government has, we think, a limited ability to exercise jurisdiction over domain name disputes as a Constitutional matter, other sovereigns may not
be so limited.171 As we note below, this insight has substantial implications.
2.

De Facto Regulatory Significance

Even if a particular sovereign’s claims for prescriptive jurisdiction are
unrecognized or controversial under international legal principles, the geography of the domain name system can nonetheless provide substantial
regulatory leverage. This de facto regulatory significance flows from the
distributed hierarchy of the domain name system: a sovereign can exercise control over the domain name system to the extent that elements of
the domain name system are under its potential physical control. This
170. As we analyzed in section II above, these in rem provisions, found in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(2) apply to cases of anonymous registrants and cases involving registrants
lacking minimum contacts with the United States. In the latter cases, the assertion of in
rem jurisdiction over the domain name will violate due process.
171. This assumes the same level of geographic connections to the critical features of
the domain name system. As we note in Section IV below, sovereigns can also take steps
to alter the geographic facts in their favor.
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typically comes from the elements being geographically located within the
sovereign’s territory. For example, because the administration of the root
server offers logical control over the entire domain name system,172 sovereign control over the root server would then allow de facto control over
the domain name system.
For example, consider the case of the United States, under the present
geographic and technical facts of the domain name system. In principle,
Congress could pass laws (or an agency could issue regulations) directed
to the public root server system. Perhaps these laws might specify the
standards by which TLDs would get access to the root servers, or even
specify the TLDs and their policies themselves. These laws might give
preferences to U.S. companies and individuals in domain name disputes,
charge taxes on any entity using a domain name, or specify the types of
uses that domain names can be put to.173 By controlling the root server, the
U.S. government could effectively control the TLD servers by threatening
banishment from the public root server system and the concomitant loss of
operation. And by controlling the TLD servers, the U.S. government could
exercise de facto control over the entire range of second-level domain
names available in the public root server system.
There is no evidence at all, we think, that the United States government is planning any activities of this sort.174 Nor, of course, are we advocating such a course, as we argue in some detail below. At present, even
the most aggressive assertion of jurisdiction we describe here—the in rem
provisions of the ACPA—falls well short of the sort of widespread de
facto control set forth above. Yet the point we noted above remains: geography matters. Put simply, both recognized and de facto control over the
domain name system are remarkably correlated with geographic facts.
This, we think, has considerable implications for the future of the domain
name system.
172. At least over the domain name system utilizing that root server. As we noted
above, this is how ICANN presently exerts nearly complete policy control over the domain name system. See supra notes 139 and accompanying text.
173. Obviously, the U.S. Constitution would provide an important limit to such regulations, especially those that might implicate rights of free expression. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Note, however, that such constraints would not necessarily restrict
similar actions by other sovereigns.
174. See generally William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce (The White Paper) (July 1, 1997), available at http://www.ejus.it/db/data/Framework_Electronic_commerce_1-7-97.htm; U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Commerce and Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Nov. 25, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm.
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THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REALSPACE SOVEREIGNS

Thus far we have analyzed the aspects of logical and territorial control
over the domain name system, arguing that in the context of realspace
sovereigns, the mapping of the logical control structure onto the physical
world results in a regulatory hierarchy. That is, those states with critical
components of the domain name system in their territory could have great
regulatory leverage over the system as a whole. This argument leads to
two other important observations. First, we note that the geographic facts
of the domain name system are both essentially arbitrary and uniquely mutable attributes,175 thereby providing realspace sovereigns with an important hook to attempt to alter the geographic facts in their favor. Second,
and following from the first, we argue that the likely result of greater regulatory activism by various realspace sovereigns will be the segmentation
of the domain name system, and the dramatic reduction in utility provided
by the system itself.
A.

Geographic Alteration: The Virtual Land Grab

Assume that Country X decides that the present quasi-U.S. approach to
the regulation of the domain name system is not in its interest. Perhaps this
country is troubled by the present strong protection of commercial trademarks embedded in both the ICANN-mandated policies and the ACPA.176
Or perhaps Country X disagrees with the principles of free expression that
have been held to extend to domain name disputes.177 Or Country X might
simply see the domain name system as a potential source of revenue.178
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Country X would have substantial
ability to at least attempt to alter the geographic facts. Country X could
establish a root server system of its own, and mandate that local networks

175. Given the distributed hierarchical nature of the DNS, the geographic location of
the “A” root servers is not especially relevant to the operation of the system. See supra
text accompanying notes 132-139.
176. See supra note 129 and accompanying text, and the Introductory Section.
177. See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting trademark claim against use of a domain name because of,
inter alia, First Amendment concerns). See generally L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers,
Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussing First Amendment and Trademark Law).
178. See, e.g., Anna Soderblom, Island Joins the Dots and Will Net Fortune, THE
TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 6, 2000 (noting that the island nation of Tuvalu expects to net
over $50 million from registrations in the .tv TLD space, “or about three times Tuvalu's
gross domestic product”). The Tuvalu case is slightly different than what we suggest
here, of course, as Tuvalu controls only the .tv TLD, rather than the root server.
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use the “official” root server.179 In a fairly benign form of this “virtual
land grab,” the Country X root server might mirror or link to the existing
public root server system, and merely offer additional TLDs.180 Country X
would be able to exert regulatory control over the additional TLDs, while
the remaining TLDs would be unaffected and remain available to Country
X users. A more troubling arrangement would be if Country X limited, or
reassigned the TLDs available in the new root server, or otherwise created
conflicts between its root server and the public server. This second set of
circumstances creates great potential for the segmentation of the worldwide domain name system, and the dramatic reduction in the value of the
system.
B.

Segmenting Domain Names

The domain name system becomes “segmented” when: (1) the same
DNS requests sent by users in different networks yield different results; or
(2) some number of TLDs are unavailable to users, depending upon the
root server system they use. Both of these circumstances arise when different root server systems are used—though the existence and use of different root servers is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.181
Segmentation arises when the various root server systems in use are either in conflict, or do not accurately reflect the content of other root servers. For example, the official “Country X Root Server” might send requests for the .com TLD to a different server than the ICANN a.rootservers.net, thereby creating a conflict—resulting in, for example, a request for www.yahoo.com yielding a different web page in different networks.182 Or the Country X Root Server might ignore requests for the .com
TLD altogether, rendering a large part of the domain name system unusable (for its users). An even more likely case is that any additional TLDs
179. Alternatively, the regulations could identify a private “alternative” root server
system—perhaps as part of a wider agreement involving policies, taxation, etc. Such alternative root server systems already exist. See, e.g., New.net, Mission Statement, at
http://www.new.net/about_us_mission.tp (last visited July 25, 2002).
180. This type of arrangement has been described as a “virtual inclusive root”. See S.
Higgs, Root Zone Definitions, at http://www.simon.higgs.com/net/draft-higgs-rootdefinitions.txt (May 2001).
181. As noted in S. Higg’s Root Zone Definitions, multiple root server systems presently exist with little, if any, problems for the system. Higgs, supra note 180. Higgs in
particular describes “private” root server systems, which are not publicly available and
are intended to serve only a single network, as well as “inclusive” root servers, which
expand the TLDs available on the standard root server system. Id.
182. This would not necessarily be the case, of course. Depending upon the details of
Country X’s redistribution plan, Yahoo!, Inc. might purchase the rights to yahoo.com in
the County X Root Server zone.
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established by Country X may not be recognized by the public root server
system, thereby making them unavailable to the Internet user community
at large.183
We predict that segmentation would result under the following circumstances:
First, a new root server system (formed or mandated by a sovereign’s
regulatory activity) could create conflicts with the existing public root
server system. These conflicts could result in unexpected behavior or the
inability for certain segments of the global Internet to utilize TLDs publicly available elsewhere.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, segmentation must be
considered a potential response by one or more sovereigns to any others’
attempts to exert unwanted regulatory influence over the domain name
system. For example, if Country X established its own root server system,
and established policies for expanded TLDs that were in conflict with the
policies of Country Y, a potential response for Country Y would be to responsively create (or mandate) a root server system that effectively
“blocked” the Country X TLDs. Lest this possibility seem farfetched, consider China’s recent suggestion that it would take steps to ensure that it
controlled the distribution and administration of all Chinese-character domain names—a task that certainly implicates the creation of alternative
root server systems, or the threat thereof.184
183. Note that we distinguish here between what we call “segmentation” of the domain name system and the present use and availability of “alternative” or “inclusive” root
server systems. In terms of numbers of users, the major alternative root server systems
differ from the hypothetical segmented system we outline above because they explicitly
include the information provided by the public root server system, and because they are
created by and backed with market forces, not sovereign government regulatory action.
We recognize that such alternative root server systems may stimulate much-needed innovation and competition in the field of domain name administration. Yet the increasing
popularity of such services only increases the chances that true segmentation develops.
184. See, e.g., Rachel Ross, China Demands Jurisdiction Over Domain Names In
Chinese, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 13, 2000 (“We think that as 97.5 per cent of the people
using Chinese characters live in the mainland and Taiwan, the U.S. government has no
right to authorize any company to manage Chinese domain names with Chinese characters,’ said CNNIC director Hu Qiheng . . . . ‘A company shouldn't be allowed to provide
Chinese domain names registration services in China without the approval of the Chinese
government.’”); Character Debate: CNNIC Opposes Foreign Firms Registering ChineseLanguage Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Nov. 3, 2000 (explaining how China is objecting to the registration and use of Chinese-character domain names by foreign entities);
Furious Fight Arises in Registration of Chinese Domain Names, Xinhua General News
Service, Nov. 17, 2000 (same); China to Strengthen Management of Chinese-Character
Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Nov. 15, 2000 (same); China Channel, CNNIC Disagree
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As should be easily apparent, segmentation of the domain name system would dramatically decrease its value to the Internet user community.185 As a means of searching and selecting online resources, the domain name system’s value is directly related to its scope; its value is at its
highest when the system includes all named online resources. Importantly,
if the domain name system cannot reliably be considered authoritative of
the resources available, its value diminishes remarkably—if an Internet
user does not have confidence that typing www.yahoo.com will yield the
information she expects, then the DNS request will be of far less value.
And while there are good arguments that the domain name system has outlived its usefulness as a uniform means of addressing the Internet searching problem, we think that an unsegmented domain name system remains
a significant value to Internet users.186 This premise—that an unsegmented
domain name system is desirable—has substantial policy implications for
realspace sovereigns.
C.

Unsegmenting Policy: Realspace Sovereigns and Domain
Names

The present United States approach to domain name regulation—at
least as reflected in legislation187—appears to be focused solely on the poOver Chinese Character International Domain Names, CHINAONLINE, Oct. 10, 2000
(same). At present, the ICANN-approved registrars are still registering such domain
names. See Verisign, Key Points About the VeriSign Global Registry Services Internationalized Domain Name Testbed, at http://www.verisigngrs.com/idn/testbed/keypts.html
(last visited July, 26 2002).
185. This appears to be a nearly universal sentiment. See, e.g., Internet Architecture
Board (Network Working Group), IAB Technical Comment on the Unique DNS Root, at
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2826.html (May 2000); ICANN, ICP-3: A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS, at http://www.icann.org/icp/icp-3.htm (July 9, 2001).
186. We think a significant argument can be made that the development of a segmented domain name system would dramatically devalue the current system and generate
alternatives to the searching and selection problem that may prove at least as effective as
the present domain name system. One obvious example might be an increasing investment in web search engines or directories. Or the development of new technologies, such
as the former RealNames “keywords” system. See, e.g., RealNames Corp., About Internet
Keywords, at http://web.archive.org/web/20011031162600/www.realnames.com/Virtual.asp?page=Eng_Corporate_How_Work (last visited July 25, 2002).The rise of and eventual replacement by alternatives to the domain name system should not necessarily be
viewed as unfortunate. Nonetheless, an unsegmented domain name system appears at
present to be high on the list of valuable approaches to the searching problem.
187. An interesting aspect of this issue is the apparent tension between the assertive
approach taken by the Congress in passing the ACPA, especially the in rem provisions,
and the more “hands off” version followed by the Clinton Administration. See, e.g., Clinton & Gore, supra note 175; U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 175.
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tential for harm to a particular form of indigenous commercial interests:
trademarks. Little legislative attention has be paid to the significant value
in the unsegmented domain name system, or more particularly, the significant diminishment in value should the system become segmented. This
omission becomes all the more serious when one considers that the aggressive assertion of jurisdiction in the ACPA188 may well satisfy the conditions under which the domain name system becomes segmented: the
encouragement of responsive actions on the part of other sovereigns.189
This is a perilous path, one that risks harming the growth and development
of the global Internet, and correspondingly portends harm to United States
interests.
In this section, we briefly discuss the justifications and contours of a
more encompassing approach to the regulation of domain names by realspace sovereigns—in particular the United States. Such an approach, we
argue, would result in greater deference to and support of the growth of
nonterritorial regulatory devices for this uniquely global asset, thereby decreasing the momentum towards segmentation.
1.

Encompassing Interests

Given that the growth of e-commerce development thus far has largely
benefited U.S. commercial interests,190 the continued development of the
Internet should be viewed as beneficial; concomitantly, obstacles to such
growth should be avoided.191 We have established above that an unsegmented domain name system is significantly more valuable to the global
Internet community than one that is partially or fully segmented. It fol188. A claim, we suggest, that can be seen most expansively in the ACPA’s in rem
proceedings. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
189. See supra Section III.C.1.
190. Measurement of the commercial activity online is, of course, subject to various
problems. But under any set of criteria, the United States seems to be doing quite well.
The top ten most visited “web properties” worldwide are all U.S. companies. See Neilsen/Netratings, Top 25 Web Properties, available at http://www.nielsennetratings.com/pr/pr011113.pdf (Nov. 14, 2001). The top ten electronic commerce sites (measured
in terms of customer sales) are entirely American. See NextCard, Ecommerce Index, at
http://www.nextcard.com/Indexes/sept_index_movers10_05_01.html (Sep. 2001). The
top ten e-commerce businesses in terms of market share are entirely American. See
Nearly Half of All Americans Buy Online, According to Nielsen//NetRatings and Harris
Interactive; $3.5 Billion Spent Online in March, Jumping 36 Percent in Past Year, BUSINESSWIRE,, at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=273
(Apr. 24, 2001).
191. Note here we are setting aside the many (and significant) non-commercial
United States’ interests in the growth of the Internet—for example the spread of democratic values.
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lows, then, that avoiding segmentation must be included as a significant
factor in the regulatory calculation for realspace sovereigns.
We can review this broader approach by explicitly considering the
harm due to segmentation. Stylizing the situation under a two-player
game, we will assume two binary choices: either to assert prescriptive jurisdiction and regulate, or defer to other sovereign entities.192 We consider
three outcomes, with arbitrary numbers assigned for illustrative purposes.
First, if both states defer, the system will remain unsegmented. If only one
state regulates (and no other state retaliates by segmenting), the system
will remain unsegmented, with some additional benefit flowing to the
regulator. And if both states regulate, the system becomes segmented, resulting in a diminishment of value. Figure 2 sets forth this basic situation,
with the payoffs as noted.
Figure 2

Here, the U.S. decision would be to regulate, on the assumption that
State X’s response would be to defer.193 Thus, the Figure 1 example might

192. As should be apparent, there are a number of “middle grounds” here that these
models fail to adequately capture.
193. This is a form of a dynamic game with complete information, as State X can
easily see the U.S. decision. The sub-game represented by the top branch has expected
payoffs of (100, 125), while the bottom branch has payoffs of (125, 100). Accordingly,
the U.S. decision will be to regulate. See H. SCOTT BIERMAN & LUIS FERNANDEZ, GAME
THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 124-135 (2d ed. 1998); DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL.,
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be said to describe the present status quo—where the U.S. has regulated to
some degree,194 and other nations appear to be more deferential.
Yet an adjustment in the payoffs could dramatically alter the nature of
this game, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3

Here, we have adjusted the payoff State X perceives if the United
States regulates and it does not. This reduction in payoff could be due to
variety of factors, a few of which we have noted above.195 Under these
new conditions, State X will choose to respond to the U.S. regulation with
regulation, and the domain name system will become segmented. Accordingly, the best U.S. decision is to defer.
Figure 4 notes one final example, where the U.S. payoff to State X
regulation is reduced as well.

GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50-77 (1994); ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES & INFORMATION
108 (3d ed. 2001).
194. At least to the extent of the in rem provisions of the ACPA.
195. See supra Section IV.A.
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Figure 4

Here again, the best U.S. decision is to regulate. That such a decision
yields the suboptimal condition of segmentation reveals the nature of this
game as a form of the prisoner’s dilemma.196
(Note of course that a still better view of this problem is as a repeated
game—that is, each sovereign has many opportunities to decide whether
to regulate or defer. Thus, if the United States considered the assertion of
regulation by another sovereign to be more harmful to its interests, it could
take the next opportunity to respond by regulating—and thereby further
confirm the suboptimal nature of this situation.)
2.

Towards Coordination

The concerns outlined above describe a substantial danger that the present domain name system will become segmented. And yet, as with most
prisoner’s dilemmas, coordination provides a solution.197 In particular, our
analysis here establishes the strong interests that realspace sovereigns, and
especially the United States, have to coordinate their regulatory behavior
with an eye to avoiding segmentation.
196. The expected payoffs for the top branch are (25, 125), while the expected payoffs for the bottom branch are (50, 50).
197. See, e.g., BIERMAN & FERNANDEZ, supra note 193, at * (noting the difference in
outcomes between cooperative games and noncooperative games); BAIRD ET AL., supra
note 193, at * (observing the importance of “binding agreements” between parties facing
a prisoner’s dilemma).


@

352%/(06:,7+7+($&3$



Such coordination will invariably require greater deference to nonterritorial domain name regulatory bodies. The paradigmatic example of this,
of course, is ICANN. As many have observed, there are a number of substantial problems with the present form of ICANN.198 However, advocating international coordination does not, we think, necessarily require endorsement of the present policies and procedures established by ICANN,
or the way in which that organization has been developed.
The challenge of integrating sovereign interests into a coherent international regulatory framework is plainly considerable,199 and we will not
solve that problem here.200 Instead, having noted in particular the perverse
incentives created by the current United States regulatory regime, and the
strong interests the United States has in avoiding segmentation, we offer a
few observations and suggestions for future consideration.
1. The in rem provisions of the ACPA are misguided and
should be repealed or substantially revised. They are of only
limited value,201 and appear to serve primarily as a particularly obnoxious example of expansive U.S. claims to regulate domain names.202
2. The United States government (and other realspace sovereigns) should take a more active role in supporting the development of international domain name policy coordination. The present ICANN approach of avoiding any signifi198. Such problems include questions about ICANN’s legitimacy, as well as its alleged bias against non-trademark holders. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the
Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000) (discussing legitimacy concerns); Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the
ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (alleging bias in the ICANN UDRP process). But
see, e.g., Michael Kaplan, Never Cry Wolf: A Response to Professor's Geist's Condemnation of the ICANN UDRP 1-11 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(disputing any showing of bias).
199. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 760-88 (1999) (discussing the theories by which the
development of international environmental regulation might be viewed); Barbara Stark,
Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an
"Entirely New Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 79-82 (1992) (discussing obstacles to
adoption of international human rights law). See generally CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra
note 145.
200. For a recent effort along these lines, see generally Paul Schiff Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction: Cyberspace, Nation-States, and Community Definition, 151
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
201. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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cant government involvement, and instead attempting to
build a strictly nongovernmental regulatory authority, fails to
grasp the unavoidable involvement of realspace sovereigns
in domain name regulation.203 Such support would include
diplomatic efforts as well as concrete actions that lend additional credibility to these organizations.
3. Finally, Congress should consider revising the ACPA to
reflect greater deference to the decisions of international
regulatory bodies. For example, Congress might consider
implementing a requirement that disputing parties seek resolution from the international domain name regulatory body
prior to filing a federal lawsuit.204 Alternatively, lawsuits
concerning a dispute where a decision has been made by the
domain name body might be more limited in their scope, in
the nature of an appeal process rather than an initial action.205

We are under no illusions that the kind of coordination required to
effectively regulate the domain name system will be simple or uncontested. Yet if we are to maintain the value of the domain name system as a
solution to the searching and selection problem, realspace sovereigns must
recognize the urgent importance of coordination and deference, and tailor
their regulatory approach accordingly.
V.

CONCLUSION

It has become commonplace to describe our world (especially the economic world) as “interdependent.” Increasingly, the flow of capital as well
as goods and services show little respect for traditional sovereign borders;
nations unable or unwilling to respond to economic changes can suffer
harm at the hands of the global marketplace.
The advent of the Internet as a powerful commercial and social medium is likely to present still greater challenges. For the Internet brings
203. See supra Section III.C.1.b.
204. The analogy here would be to administrative exhaustion principles.
205. Note that the ICANN UDRP proceedings explicitly allow parties the right to
seek relief from a court prior to actions being taken against a domain name. See UDRP,
supra note 129, ¶ 4(k). This is in the nature of granting an appellate right; we suggest that
Congress may want to formalize such an appellate process as part of an effort to recognize the authority of international domain name regulation. Cf. Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc.,
139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 7. 52-53 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that UDRP decisions do not fall
within the limited scope of review for arbitration awards provided by the Federal Arbitration Act).
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new meaning to “interdependent”: in a world where geography is fundamental to our understandings of sovereignty, the contested aspects of
online “territoriality” mean that regulation might occur everywhere, or
even nowhere. In an era when the “effects” of a commercial dispute in cyberspace might be “felt” both everywhere and nowhere, realspace sovereigns have great power to affect the global progress of the Internet. And
there is perhaps no nation with as much at stake in this game as the United
States, and no nation with as much power to lead the community of nations in determining the Internet’s future.
Yet the evidence of the U.S. approach to date has not been altogether
heartening. With respect to the regulation of domain names—perhaps the
“canary in the coal mine” of global internet regulation—the U.S. appears,
via enactment of the ACPA, and especially its self-styled in rem provisions, to have acted in an ill-informed manner that may be contrary to its
long-term interests. As we argued above, these statutory provisions suffer
from the double ignominy of being both of little value206 and inapt.207
We do not, however, believe that all is lost, or that the current U.S. approach to domain name regulation will inexorably lead to the segmentation of the domain name system. To the contrary, the mere presence of the
ICANN dispute resolution mechanism as well as the absence (to date) of
any serious attempts by other sovereigns208 to assert jurisdiction over domain names demonstrates that this problem is not unsolvable at an international scale. But any discussion about the future of international regulation
of domain names (and, in a larger sense, the Internet) must proceed with
full awareness of the essential role that realspace sovereigns play in both
the form and the content of any regulatory approach.

206. Useless in the sense that anytime the section authorizing the in rem assertion of
jurisdiction (over known persons) will be necessary, it will also violate the US Constitution to accept jurisdiction. See supra 94-98 and accompanying text.
207. Inapt in a strategic sense: because it works an aggressive approach to jurisdiction over domain names that creates significant incentives for other countries to regulate,
thus raising the possibility of segmenting the domain name system.
208. China may be the exception. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.


